ARMY HISTORY

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In This Issue

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Cover Image: *Cavalry Charge*, by Irma Maduro Peixotto/Army Art Collection, National Museum of the U.S. Army

Table of Contents Images:
Top: Soldiers of the 158th Aviation Regiment receive the German Gold Cross for Valor/Information and Media Center of the Bundeswehr

Middle: *Cavalry on the March*, by Irma Maduro Peixotto/Army Art Collection, National Museum of the U.S. Army

Bottom, left: *Cavalry in pursuit at Murfreesboro, Tennessee*, by William T. Trego/National Archives

Bottom, center: A fully caparisoned horse of the 1st Massachusetts Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, 1864/National Archives

Bottom, right: Dustoff 87 making its first landing at the contested landing zone at Isa Khel, 2 April 2010/Collection of Jason LaCrosse

EDITOR'S JOURNAL

The Fall 2011 issue presents an examination by Dennis Showalter of the role of cavalry in the history of the U.S. Army, in which he demonstrates how similar the functions of our Army's horsemen were to the use of cavalry by other nations in both hemispheres. Our mounted soldiers provided their most notable service in frontier and colonial operations against Native Americans, Filipinos, and Mexican revolutionaries, but the cavalry branch also stayed abreast of the conduct of warfare by major powers. It mounted significant actions in the Civil War and contributed important combat leaders to the world wars of the twentieth century.

Darrel D. Whitcomb provides in the second article a gripping account of a U.S. helicopter team tasked with evacuating wounded German soldiers from the midst of a difficult engagement with Taliban forces in Afghanistan in April 2010. Americans can take pride in the bravery and skill demonstrated in this operation and in the honors that German authorities bestowed upon the American medevac team.

With this issue, I bring to a conclusion my work of fourteen years as managing editor of *Army History*. The articles and reviews I have been able to offer to the journal's readers have, I believe, demonstrated the vigor and insightfulness with which writers from a variety of backgrounds are exploring the interesting and important experiences of our Army. Over those years, the Center of Military History has expanded its support for this journal, providing notably the opportunity to obtain a wide range of visual materials to enhance the written contributions and skilled designers who have been able to present an increasingly attractive product. In the past few years, the Center has provided to me as well the assistance of a book review editor, Bryan Hockensmith, to whom I am now able to turn over the management of this magazine. I trust that the journal will continue to enlighten readers with thoughtful essays about how this nation has confronted the myriad challenges that are involved in developing and employing land forces capable of implementing its highest ideals.

Charles Hendricks
Managing Editor

The Chief's Corner

Robert J. Dalessandro

Colossal Challenges and Toxic Historians

The original topic of this quarter's Chief's Corner was to be a continuation of my discussion of the future of the Army Historical Program; however, I felt that one of the sessions at this year's conference of Army historians was especially relevant to the entire community and that I needed to share my thoughts on that with you.

Before I begin that discussion, I want to ensure that each of you is fully aware of the challenges that the Department of the Army and, for that matter, the Department of Defense are currently facing. These issues are truly unprecedented. I cannot remember a time in our history when the nation was engaged in two—according to our Navy brethren, four—wars, and at the same time undergoing deep cuts in resources.

By now, most of you have gone through the initial round of civilian personnel cuts, and certainly you are aware that they will be accompanied by equivalent cuts to operational funding and to troop strength levels. Indications are that this trend will persist through the current budget cycle. Leaders at all levels will be called on to make tough choices, including mission and program trade-offs. We know that this will lead to the realignment of forces, divestiture of missions and functions, and a resetting or reshaping of the force. In short, the next decade will see significant changes to our Army.

With such a gloomy forecast of the future, how can we emerge with the Army Historical Program intact or improved? The answer is simple. We must remain relevant. Our thinking must be agile, and we must reshape our programs, turning these challenges into opportunities. I have proposed a complete reorganization of our community, centralizing history functions under the umbrella of the Center and creating three divisions focused along the functional lines of history, archives, and Army-wide museums. This organization offers a number of benefits to include ensuring continued funding for our programs in the field, with that financing flowing directly to them from the Center, and opportunities to reduce mission redundancy and increase personnel management efficiencies. I plan to unveil the specifics of this plan to you in the next issue of *Army History*.

Organizational agility can be accomplished if we have a clear understanding of our mission and vision of the future—only then can we consider what facets of that mission must be zealously protected. Without that awareness, the organization is adrift. Your mission should flow from the Center's mission statement, Army Regulation (AR) 870–5, AR 870–20, and your higher headquarters guidance. Your vision is your own, but it should certainly be in sync with that of your higher headquarters.

The Center's mission statement remains essentially unchanged. The Center accurately collects, preserves, interprets, and expresses the Army's history and material culture in order to educate and professionally develop our Army, the military profession, and the nation more broadly. Your mission should not stray significantly from this foundation.

The future I envision for the Center is as the "gold standard" for history organizations, amalgamating historical efforts that focus on operational enhancements with information technology, internal development, brand enhancement, and strategic alliances; and integrating the global Army historical community in order to achieve its indisputable relevance to the Army and the nation.

I encourage those of you in the field to use both the Center's mission and vision as the basis for your efforts to formulate the mission and vision for your program. This process can then inform the tough decisions ahead of you.

However, nothing can serve you better than remaining relevant to your command. In the end, this is the best armor against the onslaught of resource reductions. If your command sees merit and value in your program, it will see continued success and adequate resourcing.

So how do you remain relevant? One of the speakers at our recent conference of Army historians, Dr. James McNaughton, gave an excellent presentation entitled "The Toxic Historian." Jim identified a series of traits that mark the "Toxic Historian" as one who did not contribute to his command, existing in a world of his or her own. The talk alerted young historians to some of the pitfalls and indicators of the slide toward increasing irrelevance, and perhaps extinction. After listening to his paper, I felt a number of these indicators were worth sharing. All of us must clearly understand how we can remain relevant! Many of these rules are self-explanatory, but I cannot resist some editorial remarks on how to avoid this great fall from relevance.

The bold-face sentiments that follow are drawn from Jim's Jay Leno–like list. So without further ado, you know you are a Toxic Historian if . . .

Continued on page 30

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ARMY HISTORY
Fall 2011

Features

Articles

NEWS NOTES

Then Came the Fire

The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a compilation of excerpts of oral history interviews with sixty individuals directly affected by al-Qaeda's aerial attack on the Pentagon. *Then Came the Fire: Personal Accounts from the Pentagon, 11 September 2001*, captures the urgent and poignant words of survivors, some of whom were injured, and policemen, firemen, soldiers, and others who assisted in rescue efforts, describing their experiences on that dreadful day. The book includes a map of the first floor of the Pentagon and more than thirty illustrations.

Army publication account holders may obtain copies of this 328-page book from the Directorate of Logistics–Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, MO 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. Individuals may order the volume from the U.S. Government Printing Office via its Web site at http://bookstore.gpo.gov. The book should be offered for sale in September 2011 and its price announced at that time.

Center Issues Electronic Publication

The Center of Military History has issued *Art of the American Soldier: Documenting Military History Through Artists' Eyes and in Their Own Words* by Renée Klish as an electronic publication. This lavishly illustrated, 288-page book is posted on the Center's Web site at http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/epubs/art_of_the_american_soldier/index.html. It features commentary by Army artists and the curators who collected their works alongside prints of a wide selection of paintings of military life and operations from World War I to the twenty-first century. Klish provides a brief introduction to the Army's art program during this period and short biographies of the artists represented, and she cites the sources of the comments the book presents.

Book Available for Purchase

Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867, by William A. Dobak, a book whose publication by the Center of Military History was announced in the Summer 2011 issue of *Army History*, may now be purchased from the Government Printing Office. The price of the hardcover edition is $58. Paperback copies of the book are being sold for $38. Orders may be placed on the Web at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

Distinguished Writing Awards

The winners of the Army Historical Foundation's distinguished writing awards for 2010, which were announced at the organization's annual membership meeting in June of this year, included a former historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and an associate professor in the Department of Command and Leadership at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Dale Andrade, who left the Center at the end of 2010 and joined the Joint Staff History Office, won the award for the best book in the Operational/Battle History category for his work *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007–2008*, which the Center of Military History published in 2010. Andrade had gathered material he used in writing this history while deployed with the division in the years covered by his study, before returning to the Center to write the book.

Thomas G. Bradbeer won the foundation's award for the best article in the Army Professional Journals category for "General Cota and the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?" This article appeared in the Spring 2010 issue of *Army History*.

Battleground Iraq Issued as an Audiobook

At the suggestion of staff members at the Center of Military History, Findaway World has issued *Battleground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander* by Todd S. Brown as a high-definition audiobook on a self-contained Playaway® device. Donald Corren reads the book without abridgement in ten-and-a-half hours. In 2007 the Center published Brown's annotated journal covering his experiences in Iraq in 2003–2004, and the book remains available in print through the Army distribution system and from the Government Printing Office.

Call for Papers

The Society for Military History has issued a call for papers for its seventy-ninth annual meeting, which will be held on 10–13 May 2012 at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City Hotel in Arlington, Virginia.

The theme of this conference will be "The Politics of War." Conference organizers hope to attract presentations on civil-military relations, the dynamics of coalition warfare, the problems of military government and occupation, and the transition from war to peace. The program committee will, however, consider all proposals dealing with important issues in military history. They hope to attract a diverse group of participants and will especially welcome younger scholars.

Proposals for papers should include a brief abstract, a one-page curriculum vitae, and contact information. Panel proposals should include the same information relating to each paper and presenter, along with a brief description of the purpose and theme of the panel and its title. Proposals should be submitted electronically to Matt Seelinger, the conference coordinator, at matt.seelinger@armyhistory.org. Proposals must be received by 1 November 2011.

Further information about the conference is available at http://www.smh-hq.org/conference.html.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dennis Showalter is a professor of history at Colorado College in Colorado Springs, where he has taught since 1969. He was a visiting professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy from 1991 to 1993 and at the U.S. Military Academy from 1997 to 1998. He also served for four years as president of the Society for Military History. He is the author of *Tannenberg: Clash of Empires* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1991), *The Wars of Frederick the Great* (New York: Longman, 1996), *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2005), and *Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks That Revolutionized Warfare* (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2009).

National Archives

Cavalry squadron, Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, 1883

The U.S. Cavalry

Soldiers of a Nation
Policemen of an Empire

By Dennis Showalter



The twenty-first century has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the U.S. cavalry in two contexts: as horse cavalrymen and as a modern fighting force. Books by George Hofmann, Matthew Morton, and Harry Yeide have presented its operational contexts.[1] Robert Cameron focuses on doctrinal patterns.[2] Alexander Bielakowski's dissertation addresses the reaction of the cavalry's officer corps to mechanization.[3] What these works have in common is their forward thrust. The matrix in which the themes of cavalry modernization developed is treated as a preliminary stage from a perspective that is either condescending or elegiac.[4] I believe that that background merits further exploration.

The U.S. cavalry at the turn of the twentieth century did not perceive its shining times as past, nor did it define its mission as "giving tone to what otherwise would be a vulgar brawl"—and with good reason.[5] Cavalrymen then played a vital role in the Army's mission of peace enforcement. For most historians, the association of the U.S. Army with policing is inextricably linked to Russell Weigley's identification of a strategic and institutional tradition of a "border constabulary" designed for mobility as opposed to "the direct application of overwhelming power." Weigley, however, presents that tradition in a military context. His references to the "quicksilver elusiveness of Mexican irregulars" and "Indian light cavalry" make an operational point, light versus heavy, rather than a law-and-order comparison.[6] Certainly Weigley never sought to develop the argument that the Sioux, the Cheyenne, and the Apache, or later

the southern Philippine Moro juramentado and the Mexican guerrilla, were the frontier equivalents of civic delinquents best addressed by reading them their Miranda rights.

Brian Linn's seminal works on the U.S. Army in the Pacific add a dimension to the "policing" concept by describing an overseas military presence focused on defending a series of island outposts acquired in what is often considered to have been a fit of strategic absentmindedness. Both in the Philippines and on Hawaii, internal security played a central role in situations where the locals' loyalty to the United States could not be taken for granted.[7] The Philippine Constabulary, in particular, was a pacification and internal security force in the classic sense, closely linked with the military garrison and systematically cooperating with the soldiers.[8]

A more modern example of an autonomous policing force with a military matrix is the U.S. Constabulary, created in 1946 to provide a mobile patrol and security force in the U.S. zones of occupied Germany and Austria. Until its disbandment in 1952, the Constabulary provided a classic example of controlling a large area with minimum personnel, while a close examination of its history provides ample evidence of the uses of intimidation in adjusting the attitudes of still-unreconciled former enemies. The Constabulary was formed primarily from wartime mechanized cavalry squadrons. As it developed, the force took on both the panache and the trappings commonly associated with cavalry in the U.S. Army, especially the yellow scarves that were the troopers' personal identification.[9]

That panache reflected the cavalryman's century-long history as one of the Army's major symbolic figures, a status that endures today even against stiff competition.[10] Unlike his competitors for military center stage, however, the American horse soldier's defining environment is not always the battlefield. It includes the missions usually associated with a constabulary: scouting and patrolling, escorting and protecting civilians, showing the flag—the unpopular doing the unglamorous for the ungrateful, a polar opposite to the classic image of cavalry as the deciding force on stricken fields.

Policing the Home Front

If the American cavalry's constabulary heritage can be interpreted as central to its experience and its identity, the United States does not stand alone in that respect. Mounted soldiers throughout the Western world have been defined by their relationship to policing: controlling externally colonized peoples and maintaining internal security—a mission that can also be understood as sustaining internal colonization on class or ethnic bases.

In practice, military and policing missions frequently exist on a continuum—witness contemporary Iraq. There is nevertheless an essential difference. In the first case, the enemy is ultimately willing to come to you and give you all the fight you want. In the second, your primary task is getting him to stand still, whether for chastisement or catechizing.

The development of cavalry's policing role can be traced back to two eighteenth century developments. The first was the growing definition of frontiers as borders. Since before the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the limits of political authority had been understood in terms of zones rather than lines. Where lines were recognized—a geographic feature, for example, or a long-standing boundary symbol—they were usually understood in nominal terms, with goods, ideas, and people moving more or less freely on both sides and frontier residents loosely acknowledging both sets of authorities. Even a physical barrier like Hadrian's Wall in north Britain was seen as a secure base for a field army and a means of regulating traffic rather than an international border.[11]

As governments grew more powerful, the importance to them of controlling boundaries and hinterlands directly increased correspondingly.

That pattern began to change with the emergence of enlightened despotism and the resulting segues into the French Revolution. As governments grew more powerful, the importance to them of controlling boundaries and hinterlands directly increased correspondingly. Historically frontier zones had been defended locally: by Russia's Cossacks and Asian tribal regiments or by mobilized farmers like the Austrian Empire's Grenzer, who were originally refugees from lands conquered by the Turks.[12] In Europe, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars essentially made these kinds of irregulars anachronistic. A general pattern of reorganizing irregular mounted forces into battle cavalry of the line, which had begun two centuries earlier, by 1815 incorporated even such free spirits as the hussars, light cavalrymen whose exotic uniforms became ornaments rather than signifiers. In Russia, Cossack integration into the line army reached a point in the nineteenth century where one of their regiments was included in each of eighteen of the army's cavalry divisions.[13] Other tribal and ethnic

horsemen were similarly regimented or summarily disbanded.

The Cossacks nevertheless remained responsible for colonization and military service as the Russian Empire pushed south and east. The various Cossack hosts (*voiskos*) were each granted a combination of land, tax privileges, pay, and provisions when on duty, and allowed a steadily decreasing amount of internal autonomy. In return they garrisoned forts, served as border guards, and participated in local campaigns. They worked as imperial couriers and escorts. They guarded staging areas for convicts in transit. Their role as an internal security force was so familiar—and notorious—that its memory endured in a new world. "Cossack" became an enduring term of abuse, regularly hurled by immigrant strikers or demonstrators at bewildered mounted policemen in America's eastern cities.[14]

In Western Europe, the cavalry's constabulary role grew significantly after 1815. Governments were becoming increasingly concerned with internal security. Fear of the possible consequences of liberalism and nationalism led rulers to believe riots and insurrections were better overawed than put down in blood, better deterred than suppressed. That as a rule meant cavalry. In rural Ireland, for example, horse soldiers were regularly used to enforce eviction notices; in England they patrolled industrial sites and political demonstrations.[15]

In the European countryside, roads were poor, and not until mid-century would railroads enable troops to respond quickly to developments away from their garrisons. Garrisons were frequently maintained at no more than squadron strength, despite the predictable negative effects on unit training, cohesion, and morale. In towns and cities, cavalry's usefulness was limited in environments dominated by narrow, twisting streets whose cobblestones offered an effective, ready-to-hand weapon against horses and whose steep roofs provided built-in ambush sites. Not until the great urban reconstructions epitomized by Baron Haussmann's refurbished Paris were undertaken beginning in mid-century could squadrons expect to find the space needed to build sufficient momentum to ride down real or potential insurgents, and even then they could do so only if the insurgents were obliging enough to mass in the open.[16]

Results were correspondingly mixed. Tactical successes like the "Peterloo massacre" of August 1819 posed a serious risk of overkill, literally and politically, even in repressive administrative environments. In that operation, a force of volunteer yeomanry cavalry backed by regular hussars violently dispersed some fifty thousand prodemocracy demonstrators in Manchester, England, killing roughly a dozen and injuring hundreds.[17] To avoid the political damage such actions could inflict, states increasingly removed their cavalry from the internal-security business and replaced them with specially organized constabulary formations. Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, Guardia Civil, Royal Irish Constabulary—their titles varied; their missions were the same: stop trouble before it had a chance to begin by a combination of investigation and control. Among the people they oversaw, these institutions usually had evil reputations.[18] In contrast, the North-West (later Royal Canadian) Mounted Police, organized as a constabulary in 1873–1874 for the purpose of asserting sovereignty in Canada's western territories, shed its military and paramilitary functions after the suppression of the 1885 revolt led by Louis Riel made them irrelevant.[19] Its evolution into a conventional police force remains, however, unique.

European Empires and the Development of Irregular Cavalry

The second development affecting the use of cavalry as constabulary was imperialism. For the British and French in India, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the Spanish and Portuguese throughout the southern hemisphere, a major pragmatic and moral argument for shifting from economic penetration to political control was their ability to directly protect their subjects and clients. In empires where conquest overshadowed settlement, cavalry found wide scope as an instrument of social, as well as military, control.

France organized its initial squadrons of local cavalry almost as soon as the first French forces landed in Algeria. These "mounted zouaves" became the 1st Spahis in 1834. Initially, they were deployed along the new province's frontiers as a farming militia and were called out only for particular operations. Originally recruited randomly from anyone willing to take French money, the spahis increasingly obtained recruits from "big tents," the sons and retainers of leading, propertied families. The regiments correspondingly functioned as instruments of stabilization and, to some degree, assimilation. During World War II, the mechanized spahi regiments of the French Army of Liberation mixed European and North African personnel at all levels.[20]

The armies of the East India Company depended during the eighteenth century on cavalry recruited ad hoc for particular campaigns or supplied by allies and clients of the company. Led and maintained by local strongmen, indigenous irregular cavalrymen were readily available in the post-Mughal era. Enlisting them in the company's service meant goats were transformed at least temporarily to gardeners and wolves to shepherds.[21] During the early years of the nineteenth century, the company, and its Bengal Army in particular, continued to supplement with irregulars the cavalry it armed, uniformed, and trained in European fashion. The members of these additional regiments wore outfits based on regional clothing, and they provided their own horses and sometimes their own weapons as well. These formations proved more effective than their regular counterparts in the internal security work that, as British rule expanded over a heavily armed society, was a major part of the army's mission. Against small bands of thugs or dacoits, irregular squadrons proved quick and flexible. They were more cost-effective than the regulars—and arguably less socially and politically conscious as well. During the Rebellion of 1857, the Bengal Army's regular cavalry regiments were among the first to mutiny and the last to keep the field

as organized formations. The irregular regiments by contrast played a key role in both suppressing the revolt and restoring order—law is perhaps best unmentioned in an environment of near-random mass and individual reprisals, in which the irregular troopers participated enthusiastically.

When the armed forces of India were reorganized in the uprising's aftermath, almost all of the cavalry was restructured along recently proven lines. The resulting "*silladar* system" in its developed form made the regiment a joint-stock company, in which recruits literally paid for the privilege of enlisting by providing an *assami*, the funds necessary to purchase a horse and equipment. Those unable to offer cash up front were, if otherwise acceptable, able to borrow from the regiment at low interest rates.

This system, in addition to saving the government of India a good bit of money, virtually guaranteed that the Indian cavalry would be recruited from men with a stake in the British raj that at least paralleled the benefits enjoyed by the horsemen of the earlier Mughal and Maratha Empires. While the military shortcomings of British Indian cavalry were laid bare during World War I, the silladar system functioned effectively during its fifty-year heyday as an instrument of imperial stabilization and legitimation.[22]

In areas of colonial European settlement, by contrast, the most common military system was a militia based on a loose general liability for service but in fact organized and financed only when needed and recruited through bonuses and bounties in cash, land, or tax exemptions. Citizenship could also be a reward for service, particularly in regions of Spanish settlement.[23] These local forces might be supplemented by central government troops for particular occasions, but initially the regulars would either be too far away to be depended on or too poorly acculturated and acclimated to be anything but ornamental. By 1750, however, the standing armies had adapted. Where there was something worth fighting for, as in the Lake Champlain–Quebec–Montreal triangle or in the Caribbean, regulars, in the red coats of Britain, the off-white of France, or the varied colors of Spain, tended increasingly as the eighteenth century progressed to form the core of imperial campaigns, despite suffering high casualties and shocking disease rates.[24]

Imperial War Museum

Indian cavalrymen of the 20th Deccan Horse prior to their unsuccessful charge south of High Wood during the Somme offensive in World War I

That still left broad areas of European penetration and settlement where a uniform was an unusual sight. Even when substantial regular forces were present, local levies continued to play a crucial specialized role in mounted service. Cavalry was an expensive arm to maintain, and horses were virtually impossible to transport from Europe safely and in numbers on the relatively small sailing transports of the period. From the western Great Lakes of North America to Tierra del Fuego in the south, a dominant military figure in reality, and even more so in mythology, during the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century was the mounted irregular. He might be a product of a plains culture, seeming to be one with his horse and weapons, like the vaqueros, llaneros, and gauchos who formed the backbone of revolution and counterrevolution throughout Spanish America.[25] He might be a frontier farmer who used his horse primarily as a means of transportation and evasion, like the "over-mountain men" who decimated Patrick Ferguson's task force at Kings Mountain during the American Revolution. Throughout his existence, his preferred métier was the charge: with lance and bola in a hundred South American battles; with rifle and knife, like William Henry Harrison's Kentuckians in 1813 at the Battle of the Thames, or with Winchesters and revolvers in the *golpes terríficos*, or overwhelming attacks, that gave Pancho Villa temporary mastery of northern Mexico as late as 1914.

Socially and politically, mounted irregulars were poor material for state-making and nation-building. In particular, they acknowledged no authority not of their own direct choice. Their leaders, as a rule, won and maintained their places by toughness, cunning, and charisma. It was personal, not official, authority that at the end mattered to the Texas insurgents in the Alamo.[26] Villa led his Division of the North not least because of his personal reputation as the finest horseman, the fastest gun, and the best lover on the border.[27] In its developed form, this pattern nurtured caudillismo: a sense of being above the law—or rather, of acknowledging no

Senior revolutionary military leaders of northern Mexico gather in Ciudad Juarez in 1913. General Villa stands third from right.

law except one's own will. While generally associated with political developments in Latin America, caudillismo, or something closely resembling it, flourished as well at local levels in trans-Appalachia, giving way only grudgingly in the nineteenth century to a "rule of law" that was frequently as tenuous as it was idiosyncratic.[28]

The mounted irregular also posed operational problems—in particular, a tendency to use his horse to leave the scene whenever it seemed appropriate. Nathanael Greene and his principal subordinates during the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution spent a disproportionate amount of time devising ways to convince the back-country militia that formed a significant part of their order of battle to leave their horses out of easy reach on the day of a fight.[29]

Apart from the problem of personalized means of escape and evasion, irregular cavalry were relatively ineffective against steady infantry, especially infantry with some artillery support. The loose organization and casual discipline that were the source of the irregulars' mobility worked against their use as a battlefield shock instrument.

In Latin America, circumstances were different. From the beginning of the Wars of Independence, albeit with some exceptions, infantries were small in number and low in quality. "I send you forty volunteers. Please return the ropes," the famous dispatch of a Central American recruiting officer, is paradigmatic for a continent's worth of armies whose foot soldiers were frequently shanghaied, usually poorly armed, and frequently present in numbers too small to withstand even an irregular cavalry's charge.[30] As for artillery, most of that was imported until late in the century, and its high unit cost restricted both its numbers and the range of tactical uses in which it could be employed in the southern hemisphere's wars. The irregular horseman therefore retained his relative tactical importance until the major states began organizing professional armies in the European sense—a slow and incomplete development for political as well as economic reasons.

A variant of the mounted irregular made a late appearance in the Territorial Forces, or citizen militias, raised by Australia and New Zealand in the first years of the twentieth century. Both Australia's light horse and the mounted riflemen of New Zealand were disproportionately recruited in rural districts. Candidates for enlistment had to provide their own mounts. And in New Zealand at least, they proved their worth as a bulwark of established order. During the waterfront strike of 1913 there, two thousand "special constables" were enrolled, largely from the mounted rifles. The specials were dubbed "Massey's Cossacks," after the prime minister who authorized them, and they effectively used stock whips against unauthorized public gatherings.[31]

Southern Africa also depended on irregular horsemen, but its matrix was more complex. The proportion of regular British cavalry deployed to the Cape Colony between 1815 and 1898 was always relatively low, partly because service in the garrison was unpopular and partly because the local social and economic structure offered wide possibilities for recruiting all the irregular cavalry required both for the operations against the Xhosa peoples there and the campaigns against the Boers and African peoples of the northern veldt. South Africa was horseman's country, and farmers and cattle-herders of all colors and ancestries were willing to sign on for profit, opportunity, and adventure. By the 1870s, local governments had organized such permanent constabulary forces as the Cape Mounted Rifles and Natal Mounted Police, which were able both to take the field in large formations and keep the peace by detachments, as needed. Replicating the mid-century Volunteer movement in Britain, Natal and Cape Colony organized yeomanry-type formations among their settlers, and these provided men for war-raised mounted units. Boers were frequently willing to ride in commando alongside the *rooineks*, or "rednecks," as they called the British, against common enemies. The Basutos, the Griqualanders, and other black communities, initially drawn on for scouts and guides, increasingly provided organized, uniformed formations that gained respect for both horsemanship and marksmanship. Few units in the history of South Africa's wars performed better than the five troops of black cavalrymen that fought under Col. Anthony Durnford at Isandhlwana in 1879. That any survivors escaped to tell the tale owed much to the Edendale Troop's last-ditch effort covering the ford of the Mzinyathi River while its ammunition lasted.[32]

The Emergence of the U.S. Cavalry, 1776–1865

The United States had been an independent nation for three quarters of a century before cavalry truly came into its own in the U.S. Army's order of battle. In the nation's initial decades, cavalry's most visible role seems to have been played by urban volunteer formations best known for escorting visiting notables in parades. For most of the Revolutionary War, George Washington expressed limited interest in developing his cavalry arm. The four regiments of Continental light dragoons that Washington did organize beginning in late 1776 focused more successfully on reconnaissance than combat. The Continentals' lack of emphasis on cavalry derived in part from the higher cost of effective cavalry formations relative to those of infantry and artillery, an important factor in an era of congressional parsimony and untapped national wealth. General Washington also recognized that he could draw on irregular mounted militia units and volunteer mounted contingents of higher quality than infantry militiamen.[33]

General Wayne Obtains a Complete Victory over the Miami Indians by Frederick Kemmelmeyer

Operationally, mounted action during the Revolution was usually most effective when small units seized fleeting opportunities. On both sides, the characteristic formation that emerged by the war's end was the "legion." Introduced in the mid-century wars of Europe, this was a mixed force of cavalry and infantry, numbering two or three hundred of each. Legions were intended and used by European armies not as battle instruments, but for scouting, screening, and raiding.[34]

A fully caparisoned horse of the 1st Massachusetts Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, 1864

After 1783, regular mounted forces continued to receive low priority from successive administrations. Anthony Wayne's brilliantly successful "Legion of the United States" was a predominantly infantry force with no more than a few troops of cavalry, heavily dependent on irregulars for its mounted work.[35] Cavalry retained an aura—perhaps better said a miasma—of expensive elitism that retarded its development almost as much as the absence of significant operational roles in the era of "broadax and bayonet." An army regarded—and that in good part saw itself—as an instrument of national development had little use for soldiers perceived as unwilling to get their hands dirty, literally or metaphorically, for the public weal. Nor, after the final crushing of northwestern Indian resistance during the War of 1812, was there much perceived need for a mounted force until the lines of settlement began advancing onto the Great Plains. The dragoon regiment raised in 1833 spent much of its early existence justifying its existence to congressional cost-cutters. The 2d Dragoons, raised in 1836, saw most of its initial action on foot in the swamps of Florida during the Seminole Wars. When in 1846 Congress raised a third mounted regiment, it continued to eschew the controversial term *cavalry*, favoring the more utilitarian

"mounted riflemen." The regiment's avowed mission, moreover, was presented as passive: the protection of the Oregon Trail and the peaceful emigrants using it.[36]

The Mexican War marked the apogee of the volunteer irregular horseman in the U.S. Army's order of battle. The state-raised mounted regiments that participated compared favorably with the small regular contingents against a Mexican cavalry that was both lighter and less capable than its North American opponents. The performance of Col. Alexander Doniphan's 1st Missouri Mounted Volunteers in an independent campaign in northern Mexico stood out particularly as an example of temporary horse soldiers at their best.[37] Texas had a militia heritage dating back to its days as part of Mexico. Initially the immigrants from the United States had primarily served on foot in this militia, while the tejanos of Spanish ancestry provided the mounted element.[38] By the time of the Mexican War, however, the Texas Rangers, which had formed the primary military force of the Republic of Texas, was dominated by Anglos. Companies under local notables like Jack Hays and Ben McCulloch lived up and down to their irregular heritage. They functioned as scouts and guerrillas and occasionally as shock troops for the armies of Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott; other ranger units guarded the Indian frontiers.[39]

Fierce fighters but indifferent to discipline and significantly atrocity-prone, the rangers brought with them a distinctive tactical style based on maintaining the initiative whatever the risk, which reflected their usual experience of being heavily outnumbered. That experience also shaped their very distinctive style of dress and their habit of loud screaming in a charge, which some accounts suggest inspired the "rebel yell" of the Civil War. Both were considered ways of intimidating enemies and enhancing one's own courage. Arguably more effective in achieving these ends were the repeating pistols the Texans favored as close-quarter weapons, in good part because they could match neither Indian nor Mexican skill with edged weapons. These pistols greatly impressed the regular cavalrymen.[40]



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During the Civil War, the U.S. Army's large cavalry elements required the services of many blacksmiths.

Only during the 1850s did the U.S. Army's cavalry begin taking on its modern identity. The growing professionalism of the regular officer corps clashed in a comprehensive and fundamental way with the Jacksonian concept of innate military talent that informed the irregular tradition.[41] The growing American penetration of the Great Plains brought with it questions of sovereignty and slavery that increasingly divided the nation. These, in turn, generated conflicts that could neither be settled through on-the-spot negotiation nor resolved by local ranger forces or part-time militias.[42] The major Plains tribes were themselves riding the crest of a wave produced by their success over the past century in using the horse as an instrument of conquest and exploitation—a success enhanced to a degree by the demographic revolutions wrought on the Great Plains by the smallpox epidemic of the late eighteenth century. Trading between nomadic and sedentary tribes increasingly gave way to raiding as a preferred means of obtaining desired goods. Confident in their own prowess, the raiding cultures were willing in the pre–Civil War years to risk open battle, going head to head and hand to hand with an army they had as yet learned neither to fear nor to respect.[43]

The Plains peoples also grew increasingly sophisticated in profiting from the European lines of settlement pushing north from Mexico and west from the Mississippi. The Comanche, in particular, established a "triangle trade": raiding Texas farms and ranches, then selling the livestock to middlemen or running it into northern Mexico. Comanches regularly moved horses and cattle hundreds of miles across Texas

Lt. Col. George A. Custer

with the skill and aplomb of modern-day auto thieves, laughing at civilian authority and civilian security forces themselves constrained by the small size of both Texas counties and the Texas budget.[44]

The result was a massive expansion of the U.S. Army's mounted arm in 1855, when two full regiments were raised to reinforce the three already in existence. Since there were only ten infantry regiments in the U.S. Army's order of battle, the balance was strikingly different from the force structure of any European armies. There the proportion of cavalry was steadily declining as conscription and technology fundamentally altered the proportions of European nations' land forces.

Rather than adjusting American armies to European templates, the Civil War supported the horse soldiers' position in two ways. One was the Union cavalry's development (with major contributions from the horse artillery) into a combined-arms striking force, integrating shock and fire tactics from regiments to divisions and able to conduct sustained independent operations at corps level.[45] The other involved rejection of the historic pattern of making effective use of local mounted forces. Rather, in an arc of territory cutting from southwestern Virginia through east Tennessee and northern Alabama to Arkansas and into Missouri, the mounted elements supporting both sides did little more than contribute to the breakdown, not merely, of law and order but of civilization itself in areas that lay outside the main armies' zones of interest or control.[46]

Missouri offers perhaps the best and certainly the most familiar example. The state organized over a dozen regiments of militia cavalry in response to an ongoing threat by Confederate irregulars. Their success in checking William Quantrill, Bill Anderson, George Todd and their companions was, to say the least, limited, especially relative to the resources committed.[47] The massacre at Sand Creek in Colorado by a local unit of hundred-day volunteers, the 3d Colorado Cavalry, further highlighted the limitations of local forces in Indian warfare—particularly compared to regiments such as the 6th and 7th Iowa Cavalry and the 11th Ohio Cavalry, which compiled distinguished records in frontier operations well away from their home states in locations where there were no Regular Army soldiers within hundreds of miles.[48]

Constabulary Functions, 1865–1890

The U.S. Army as reconfigured after 1869, with ten regiments of cavalry and twenty-five of infantry, continued to possess the First World's highest proportion of mounted troops. But the cavalry's big-unit experiences in 1864–1865 were increasingly overlaid by a new responsibility: internal security, on both counterinsurgency and imperialist models. This development involved three focal points. The first was Reconstruction. The states of the abortive Confederacy contained a large number of unreconciled former enemies who were heavily armed and possessed a developed ideology of resistance. That ideology, white supremacy, took on virulent and overt manifestations after Appomattox. In addition to the terror spawned by the Ku Klux Klan and similar, unsanctioned nightriders, struggles between Confederate veterans and challenged Reconstruction governments over contested elections, involving control of reorganized state militias, frequently spilled over into civil conflict.

Guy V. Henry, a Civil War Medal of Honor recipient, lost the use of an eye as a cavalry captain in combat with the Sioux in 1876. He became a cavalry colonel in 1897 and a major general and commander of the Department of Puerto Rico in 1898.

For ten years after the Civil War's end, regular cavalry regiments old and new played a crucial role in suppressing vigilante violence and sustaining public order. Neither mission, however, was particularly popular, especially as war veterans were replaced by new faces in the junior officer corps. President Rutherford B. Hayes' decision in 1877 to end the use of federal troops for civil purposes in the South in 1877 was welcome to men who had not sought a military career for the purpose of controlling their fellow white citizens.[49]

In the West as well, civil authorities had grown increasingly accustomed to requesting support from the Army. Before the Civil War, regulars had played a key role in preventing "Bleeding Kansas" from collapsing into anarchy. After Appomattox, U.S. marshals and federal judges frequently requested troops to back up their authority. State, territorial, and local governments also turned to nearby garrisons for armed support, sometimes in situations where the legal situation was obscure. New Mexico's Lincoln


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Class of 1885, Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth

County War is a familiar example, but scarcely the only one, of cavalry officers with at best limited understanding of the law's details finding themselves whipsawed for decisions about whom to support and how.[50]

The increasing hostility to the employment of federal troops to aid civil authority was further enhanced by the second focal point of internal security: the Army's increasing involvement in labor disputes during the 1870s. When embryonic state militias proved inadequate to maintain security, the regulars were committed—especially during the great railway strikes of 1877. Most officers found the mission distasteful—not from a cultivated sympathy for the rights of the laboring man, but from the conviction that the Army must stand above these kinds of civic struggles.[51] The states' determination in the aftermath of the 1877 strikes to develop volunteer National Guard units sufficiently strong and effective to maintain order and sustain existing systems of race and class relations and property rights made possible the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This law prohibited federal military forces from aiding civil authorities except by order of the president, leaving National Guard units in most instances with the primary responsibility for enforcing state and federal laws when challenged by organized groups.

The act's implementation in the next quarter-century reflected another development in American society and the U.S. military system. The National Guard was essentially an urban institution, depending for its existence even in rural states on a growing network of towns large enough to support a company by drawing on the surrounding countryside. The Guard also remained essentially an infantry force as long as the states were funding its equipment. Its combined-arms aspect developed only as the federal government began to see it as a second line of national defense, and up to World War I it remained unbalanced.[52] Those developments reflected and symbolized the final disappearance of the civilian matrix that had supported the irregular mounted rifleman. After Appomattox, the Regular Army's cavalry had assumed that role, most obviously on the Great Plains.

After 1870, the U.S. cavalry found itself in a new operational environment. The Plains Wars, as wars, ended in the late 1860s. The struggle for the Bozeman Trail was the last occasion any Indian people took the fighting to their enemies. By the time that conflict ended in 1868—in a treaty that closed the trail and abandoned the forts defending it—the nature of the future was becoming all too clear. Red Cloud, arguably the Sioux Indians' greatest general and certainly their clearest-headed leader, soon recognized that further armed resistance was futile and grudgingly accommodated to the circumstances.[53] Further south, the Kiowas and Comanches, who had rolled back the line of settlement in Texas a hundred miles and more during the Civil War, saw those gains erased within months after Appomattox. While the Army required another decade to break the southern tribes, the Indians' efforts never again rose above the category of raiding. In Arizona and New Mexico, the Apache peoples fought a similar rearguard action as hopeless as it was fierce.[54]

The soldiers kept coming and the Plains peoples could not replace their casualties. Chief Joseph's elegiac recital of Nez Perce losses is paradigmatic.

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A troop of the 4th Cavalry enters the town of Indang, Cavite Province, Philippine Islands, in 1900.

Increasingly the Indians' strategy—the only one they could advantageously pursue—was to stay out of their opponents' way. Even the "Great Sioux War" of 1876 has a one-sided title: it was a war only from the perspective of the U.S. government. The Sioux and their allies took the field to hunt, not fight; Custer needed luck to catch up with them.[55]

Internal security's third focal point was the declining scale of overt warfare on the frontier. During the 1800s, the Army's primary missions in that region steadily devolved toward a de facto constabulary model: patrol and pursuit. For both of these, cavalry was the logical choice—though when troop horses gave out under plains conditions, the "walk-a-heaps" of the infantry regiments often completed the operations. Combat involving more than one troop correspondingly became secondary, to a point where most cavalry formations were significantly less well armed and trained than their Civil War predecessors. The displacement of the Spencer and its lever-action successors by the single-shot Springfield carbine provided improved range at a significant cost in firepower. Marksmanship and horsemanship declined exponentially by the standards of 1864–1865. Tactics, especially in an emergency, too often involved nothing more sophisticated than dismounting and improvising cover until relief arrived or the Indians drew off. The horse became a battle taxi. A strong argument can be made that Custer's immediate command was doomed when it dismounted, and it dismounted because nobody except perhaps its commander knew any longer how to both move and fight mounted.[56]

The auxiliary forces employed in the Plains Wars also followed a constabulary pattern. Local settler volunteers were seldom employed, usually because their discipline and effectiveness were sufficiently suspect to render them dispensable in an operational environment lacking pitched battles that demanded nothing more than warm bodies. Neither the 19th Kansas Cavalry in the Washita campaign nor the ad hoc Oregon volunteers of the Modoc War did anything to modify that conviction. The average settler, whether farmer, rancher, or townsman, was, moreover, quite willing enough to leave the fighting to the soldiers—a possible reflection of an individualism that had replaced the community orientation of the trans-Appalachian frontier. The Texas Rangers may provide an exception to the generalization. But when that force was reorganized in the aftermath of Reconstruction, it operated almost as a Texas army, playing an independent role in maintaining security inside—and occasionally across—the state's borders, regarding the regulars as a Yankee nuisance, and cooperating with them at arm's length if at all.[57]

The U.S. Army's use of Indians also reflected an auxiliary/constabulary model. The closest thing to a sepoy force enlisted during the Plains Wars was the North Brothers' Pawnee Battalion, and it was more war party than military formation.[58] The norm was tribes serving as allies against their enemies, fighting under their own leaders and in their traditional fashion like the Shoshone in



Members of Troop A, 7th Cavalry in Cuba, in 1902

the Great Sioux War. Otherwise they were commonly employed individually as scouts, working closely in small numbers with regular troops.[59] The most sophisticated use made of Indians under Army command, however, was during the Apache Wars. The Apache were primarily concerned with avoiding contact, and on their own ground they were disproportionately successful at evading even the best-acclimated of the regulars. In the end, detachments of Apaches individually recruited and commanded by hired civilians or officers detailed for the purpose ran to earth equally small numbers of Apaches refusing to accept reservation life.[60] The French would develop a similar force, the Goums, during their occupation of Morocco. The British would eventually follow suit, though on a larger scale, with their own tribally structured "scouts" along India's northwest frontier.[61]

Yet on closer examination, the cavalry's adaptation to its de facto constabulary role was at best incomplete. Probably the best example of its limits took place at Wounded Knee in 1890. This controversial episode, frequently described as a deliberate massacre, is best understood in terms of the misapplication of a military model to a constabulary problem. The Sioux who had left their reservations did not seek a fight. They were emerging from a collective religious experience and were panicked by the arrival of large numbers of troops in the region. The Army's clumsy efforts to disarm them provoked a reaction whose outcome was determined by firepower. There was nothing original or unique about Wounded Knee. Europe's armies had accumulated a wealth of experience on what was likely to happen when even well-disciplined soldiers confronted large numbers of frightened, excited people at gun-barrel distance. That was why constabularies had been created.[62]

A constabulary system is based on the principle of establishing or restoring community—or at least the "order and law" that is its foundation. In theory, Plains Indians were perceived as "wards of the nation." One approach to explaining the cavalry's limitations as a plains constabulary, however, is based on the argument that policy toward Indian combatants in practice followed an "insurrectionary principle," which denied them legitimacy and put them outside the protection of the laws of war just as the Alamo's garrison had been in 1836.[63] That approach gains further credibility because of the high degree of cultural alienation existing between the adversaries, which only increased in this period. That the concept of "whiteness" is a construction or invention is now firmly established, but there is a tendency to overlook the correspondingly constructed nature of "Indianness" in this period. Even by comparison with the cis-Mississippi experience, hardly an exercise in multiculturalism, neither white nor Indian communities were willing to extend community to the other, collectively or on an individual basis, except on terms they controlled.

Racist the soldiers certainly were—and this included most of the self-taught anthropologists in uniform who developed a solid working knowledge of the peoples they sought to control.[64] For all its homicidal rhetoric, frequently quoted out of context, the

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General Pershing drew heavily on cavalry officers for his staff in Mexico. They included, left to right, Capt. William Reed, intelligence officer; 1st Lt. James Lawton Collins, aide-de-camp to the commander; Col. De Rosey Cabell, chief of staff, all cavalry officers; General Pershing, who had been a cavalryman before becoming a general officer; Maj. John L. Hines, adjutant general; Col. George O. Cress, division inspector; and Capt. Leon B. Kromer, quartermaster. The last two officers were also cavalrymen.

Army's practical focus was nevertheless on pacification, not annihilation. Killing Indians was a secondary mission. The primary one was introducing or restoring them to a reservation system that seemed to the American people and their government to be the most practical way to proceed in a sadly imperfect world.[65]

Redefinition as a Combat Arm

The frontier's official closing in 1890 coincided with the cavalry's relegation to such low-risk missions as taking Ute children to reservation schools when their parents balked or helping run an embryonic national park system.[66] Othello's occupation indeed seemed gone. And it might have been, had not the U.S. cavalry defined itself throughout the Plains Wars as a military force.

That image persisted even as, with Indian fighting becoming a thing of the past, some military writers began considering socially acceptable missions for the Army—including a role as a national gendarmerie. Two Army schools founded in the late nineteenth century facilitated the reevaluation of the role of the cavalry. The Infantry and Cavalry School established at Fort Leavenworth in 1881 and the Cavalry and Light Artillery School, organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1892 both provided field and classroom instruction to junior officers of cavalry and other combat arms. A student billet at the latter institution, which was renamed the Mounted Service School in 1907 and the Cavalry School in 1919, developed into one of the most sought-after assignments in the cavalry, as the school became much more than an institutionalized affirmation of unreflective horsiness.

Both schools nurtured cavalrymen who became important wartime leaders. Cavalry graduates of the Infantry and Cavalry School included Joseph T. Dickman (class of 1883), who commanded the 3d Division and the First and Fourth Corps during World War I and the Third Army during the postwar occupation of Germany, and James G. Harbord (class of 1895), who commanded the 2d Division and served as chief of staff of the American Expeditionary Forces during that war. Cavalry graduates of the Mounted Service School and Cavalry School included George S. Patton Jr. (1914, 1915, 1923), who commanded Seventh Army and Third Army, and Terry de la Mesa Allen (1916, 1924), who commanded the 1st and 104th Infantry Divisions with distinction in World War II.[67]

U.S. cavalrymen also maintained connections with the wider intellectual world of mounted service through the publication of the *Cavalry Journal*, the first issue of which appeared in 1888, anticipating the changes that accompanied the frontier's closing by a couple of years. Prior to World War I, that periodical may have been intellectually the strongest branch journal issued by any army, anywhere—Germany included. The journal featured lead articles on the arm's employment


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Site of buildings in Columbus, New Mexico, foreground, destroyed in the March 1916 attack by General Villa's mounted troops from Mexico.

in modern war, on organization, and on training. Almost half of each issue was devoted to translations from European literature addressing those subjects. The journal explored the cavalry's history by reprinting critical analyses of Civil War operations written by officers with senior command experience, like Wesley Merritt. There was little nostalgia and less shop talk of the kind featured today in most U.S. Army branch periodicals. Sport, which dominated the journal's pages after World War I, was ignored earlier—despite the growing importance of polo, introduced from civilian sources, in many regiments.

The cavalry also developed by playing a major operational role in the Spanish-American War in 1898. It contributed one of the Cuban Expedition's three divisions. This division conducted the entire campaign dismounted without missing a beat, leaving nothing to choose between the fighting power or tactical effectiveness of the Army's two dominant branches. This was the kind of large-scale flexibility on which the Civil War's Union cavalry had justly prided itself. The contrast with the common image of the British Army's regular cavalry in the earlier stages of the South African War, allegedly helpless once off its horses, was widely noted. British troopers subsequently did achieve successes against the Boers, notably at the relief of Kimberley in February 1900, but most of them seem to have been gained as the horsemen learned to fight afoot, "American style," as well.[68]


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Four U.S. cavalry officers, from left, Maj. John Eager, Lt. Gordon Rogers, Maj. George Patton, and Maj. Jacob Devers, receive the Argentine Polo Cup, July 1931.

The U.S. cavalry thus emerged enhanced from the Army's enlargement in the new century. While the infantry expanded from twenty-five regiments to thirty, the cavalry's strength grew by half, from ten regiments to fifteen. Unlike in Europe, moreover, where a full-strength cavalry regiment ranged between five hundred and a thousand men compared to an infantry regiment's thirty-five hundred to forty-five hundred, the U.S. Army's cavalry and infantry regiments were nearly the same size: about fifteen hundred in one case, two thousand in the other.

These figures might be dismissed as irrelevant, since few regiments even approached them except by chance. They are significant, however, because the twentieth-century U.S. cavalry built its doctrine and its tactics around what might be called "large regiments," and it did so despite extensive criticism to the effect that no mounted unit of such size could be handled effectively. U.S. writers pointed out the regiment was composed of three 400-man squadrons and argued that these were an optimal size for the kind of charges that were likely at the current levels of firepower. In contrast to European cavalry leaders, who organized their forces for mounted action on a divisional scale, with charges


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Soldiers of Troop M, 11th Cavalry, water their horses near Colonia Dublán, Mexico, 1916.

to be delivered by brigades in succession, U.S. theorists saw any mounted attack larger than a squadron as an unlikely anomaly. In the Saber, M–1913, the U.S. cavalry acquired what may have been the world's best thrusting sword. Equally important in theory and training was the pistol charge—an indirect legacy of the Texas irregulars, though the likelihood of even a well-trained man hitting anything with a .45 automatic from the back of a moving horse can only be speculated.[69]

No less important for the cavalry's development in the early twentieth century was the concept of close cooperation of mounted and temporarily dismounted units within the large regiment. The U.S. cavalry in the two decades before 1914 saw itself neither as a primarily mounted force, like its French, German, or Austrian counterparts, nor as a body of mounted riflemen along the lines of Australia's light horse, but rather as mounted soldiers able to fight effectively on foot when needed, like the British. Indeed, American cavalry training stressed versatility. American troopers were armed not with carbines but with the same rifle the infantry carried. At the same time, horsemanship improved significantly over what it had been in the Plains Wars. "Cavalry country" was defined as anywhere a horse could be ridden or led and where pack trains could follow. The cavalry division as theoretically constructed before the Great War at a strength of up to eighteen thousand men, with nine cavalry regiments as well as its own artillery, engineers, air squadron, and organic supply systems, including pack trains, wagons, and trucks, was a legitimate successor to the mounted forces of Civil War cavalry leaders Philip H. Sheridan and James H. Wilson, capable of independent operations in cooperation with a main force—arguably even capable of operating entirely on its own.[70]

The revitalized cavalry's first principal theater of operations was the new American empire. Even had cavalry been considered as prima facie unsuitable for work in the jungles of the Philippines, on the islands of the Hawaiian archipelago, or in Cuba for the few years of American occupation there, its strength relative to the rest of the Army would have ensured the mounted arm's large-scale overseas deployment. But during the pacification of the Philippines and afterward, cavalry regiments generally proved just as valuable as infantry both in combat and in the routine work of providing security.[71] As many as eight regiments served in the islands at one time. In part this reflected the cavalry's continued capacity for long-term dismounted operations—and an accompanying willingness to accept horses as expendable that was not widely shared by the mounted arms of other nations. But in its role of being first on the spot with enough rifles to make a difference, cavalry proved its worth from Luzon to Mindanao. In 1914, the Philippines' garrison included two cavalry regiments compared to just three of infantry. In Hawaii, the ratio was one to two. Maneuver scenarios regularly pitted the arms directly against each other—evidence enough that cavalry was hardly marginalized.

The final defining event for the U.S. cavalry as a combat force, however, was an expedition into Mexico occasioned by the apparent decay of that nation into what is today called a "failed state." The democratic revolution launched in 1910 by Francisco Madero against the long-entrenched government of Porfirio Diaz unleashed a lengthy struggle for power among competing Mexican civilian and military leaders, each able to draw upon support from elements of the population buffeted by the nation's recent economic difficulties. Presidents William H. Taft and Woodrow Wilson followed this contest closely and exerted U.S. diplomatic and military influence on behalf of leaders they preferred.[72]

The U.S. cavalry was at first only called upon to bolster U.S. garrisons along the Mexican border, where by 1914 eight of the Army's fifteen cavalry regiments were deployed. But after a 400-man mounted force led by Mexican revolutionary General Francisco (Pancho) Villa overran Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916, despite the fact that Col. Herbert Slocum maintained the headquarters of the 13th Cavalry there, Wilson sent Brig. Gen. John Pershing into northern Mexico at the head of a cavalry-heavy force to destroy Villa's military assets. The expedition was much more successful in achieving this goal than was immediately recognized. The fact that the cavalry's major successes were in the constabulary and counter-insurgency arena, while even small-scale skirmishes, like that at Parral, often had limited or embarrassing results, probably caused the unduly cautious

U.S. Special Forces soldiers ride with Northern Alliance cavalrymen in Afghanistan, November 2001.

evaluation of the expedition's outcome.[73]

The Southwest frontier zone remained a magnet and a fata morgana for the mounted arm throughout the Great War and for years afterwards. A cavalry branch that sent no more than an improvised squadron to the front in France and that saw the horse challenged and then replaced, by motorcycles, trucks, and armored cars in the United States beginning in the 1920s, continued to locate its primary mission in the desert terrain along the border with Mexico, where motorization and mechanization alike remained at a discount.[74]

In Europe, by the 1930s the horsemen were secondary to the motorized element of cavalry formations. The mounted rifleman in his final, professional version still remained, however, the central combat element of the U.S. cavalry. Everything else, up to and including armored cars and tanks, played secondary roles, providing reconnaissance, fire support, and transport. That route led first to marginalization alongside an improvised creation, the Armored Force; then to the elimination of the horse from the Army's combat provisions in 1947; and yet to an eventual revival of equine use by U.S. Special Forces supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001. These, however, are other stories, for presentation by other scholars. What this essay indicates is that the U.S. cavalry was ultimately composed of soldiers and not policemen. Temporarily acculturating to constabulary missions, this nation's cavalry nevertheless consistently maintained its identity and position as a military instrument—one, moreover, with a significantly larger, more central, role than its European counterparts.

Notes

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3. Alexander M. Bielakowski, "United States Army Cavalry Officers and the Issue of Mechanization, 1920 to 1942," Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2002.

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Darrel D. Whitcomb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1969. He served three tours as an Air Force officer in Southeast Asia, where he was a cargo pilot and forward air controller. After transferring to the Air Force Reserve, he flew A–37 Dragonfly and A–10 Thunderbolt II (or Warthog) aircraft, served on the Air Staff and Joint Staff, and attended the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College. He retired as a colonel in 1999. He also pursued a civilian career as a pilot for Delta Airlines. In 2003–2004, he served as a contract pilot in Iraq, where he logged ninety-five missions. He is the author of *The Rescue of Bat 21* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998), an account of the largest search-and-rescue operation in the Vietnam War; *Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2006); and *Call Sign "Dustoff": A History of U.S. Army Aeromedical Evacuation from Conception to Hurricane Katrina* (Frederick, Md.: Borden Institute, 2011).

Collection of Jason LaCrosse

The crews of the three helicopters at Isa Khel gather in front of one of the craft. In front row, left to right, are Sergeant Ebel, Chief Warrant Officer Husted, Chief Warrant Officer Brown, and Specialist Martinez. Standing, left to right, are Specialist Marchese, Chief Warrant Officer Wells, Sergeant Brown, Chief Warrant Officer LaCrosse, Specialist Baker, Captain McDonough, Chief Warrant Officer Johnson, Chief Warrant Officer Visaya, Sergeant Shumaker, and Sergeant Gattis.

Good Friday Medevac

By Darrel D. Whitcomb

The emergency call came into the Medevac operations center at Kunduz, Afghanistan, early on the afternoon of 2 April 2010. The news was bad. "Golf" platoon of the 3d Company of the German Army's Parachute Battalion 373, which was conducting operations in the area, had been ambushed by Taliban elements at the town of Isa Khel, about six miles southwest of Kunduz. During the intense ensuing firefight, two German soldiers had been seriously wounded, and they needed immediate medical evacuation (medevac).

Fortuitously, U.S. Army Medevac aircraft and crews were at Kunduz, available for tasking. Just a few months prior, the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Howe, had deployed from its base near Katterbach, Germany, to support the operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as the main element of Task Force READY. Situated primarily in the western portion of Afghanistan, the task force quickly began conducting operations. The 5th of the 158th's "Charlie" Company had deployed with its twelve UH–60A medevac helicopters. It dispersed these to scattered locations, sending to Kunduz in northern Afghanistan a detachment of two aircraft and crews, who used the call signs Dustoff 87 (DO–87) and Dustoff 84 (DO–84). Commanded by Capt. Robert McDonough, the Kunduz team

also included an armed UH–60L Black Hawk helicopter that was provided as a support aircraft by the 5th Battalion. It used the call sign Black Magic 70 (BM–70). This was the only medevac team available to support coalition operations in the northern region of Afghanistan.[1]

to their craft for takeoff. BM–70, crewed by pilots CWO2 Sean Johnson and CWO2 Eric Wells and crew chiefs Sgt. William Ebel and Spec. Todd Marchese, also lifted off to provide direct support for the effort.

The helicopters approached the location of Golf platoon in just a few minutes. Upon their arrival in the area, LaCrosse directed the crew of BM–70 to fly ahead to establish contact with the ground force and determine the current battle conditions. The crews of both aircraft tuned their radios to the frequencies that had been designated for the German platoon, but neither was able to establish communication with it. As BM–70 circled over the designated landing zone, Chief Warrant Officer Brown prepared to land DO–87. Soon after the medevac craft began to descend, Sergeants Brown and Shumaker spotted intense enemy small-arms and automatic-weapons fire and dangerous rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) being directed at it and promptly notified their pilots. LaCrosse directed Chief Warrant Officer Brown to abandon the approach, and they flew the aircraft to a safer altitude to consider another tactical plan.

As Brown was maneuvering his craft to avoid the serious threat, his crew spotted a German soldier standing in a field to the north trying to signal to them with a white smoke grenade. They landed to speak with him and learned that a pitched battle was occurring and that the wounded were at another location. Concerned that the situation was very dangerous and unsure of the location of the wounded personnel, LaCrosse ordered Brown to take off again and loiter in a safe area until the medevac team could make contact with the ground force.[2]

After both crews made repeated unsuccessful attempts to contact the ground force by radio, Chief Warrant Officer Brown, at LaCrosse's direction, landed DO–87 once more, to enable a member of the crew to speak again with the German soldiers and ask their help to locate the wounded. That effort had still not borne fruit, however, when the

As the helicopter made its landing approach, the enemy forces shifted their withering small-arms and automatic-weapons fire from the German forces to the aircraft.

Instructor pilot CWO3 Jason LaCrosse had been designated as commander of the team's air missions for that day. After receiving the initial medevac request and obtaining a quick intelligence and operations update, he and his crew of DO–87, which included pilot CWO2 Jason Brown, medic S. Sgt. Travis Brown, and crew chief Sgt. Steven Shumaker, sprinted

crew of DO–84, which had been monitoring the actions of both DO–87 and BM–70 from Kunduz, procured from the command element there the radio frequency being used by a joint tactical air controller (JTAC) to contact Golf platoon. They passed this information to LaCrosse. He directed both crews to tune their radios to that frequency, and they immediately made contact with

Collection of Jason LaCrosse

Dustoff 87 making its first landing at the contested landing zone at Isa Khel, 2 April 2010

the JTAC, who was using the call sign "Red Baron." Red Baron, who was helping to coordinate F–15 and F–16 air strikes, informed the helicopter crews that the Germans believed that the current landing zone, where DO–87 had been unable to land earlier, remained too dangerous for medevac craft to use and that they could move the wounded to a secondary landing zone. LaCrosse told the Red Baron that he and his crew did not want to wait for the wounded to be moved and announced that DO–87 would land at the current landing zone. So the German detachment prepared its wounded men for pickup as Brown began a new approach to the contested location.

As the helicopter made its landing approach, the enemy forces shifted their withering small-arms and automatic-weapons fire from the German forces to the aircraft. This enabled the Germans to spot the enemy elements and smother them with counterfire, effectively shifting the momentum of the battle. In addition, BM–70 used its guns to attack enemy elements as it circled above the combat zone. As DO–87 settled safely on the ground, Sergeant Brown, the medic, dismounted and quickly helped to load the first critically wounded soldier. As soon as he was strapped in and Sergeant Brown was back aboard, DO–87 lifted off and, accompanied by BM–70, headed for Kunduz. "Fly faster," Sergeant Brown called out to the pilots as he fought to keep the critically wounded soldier alive.[3]

Landing at Kunduz, the crew quickly unloaded their patient and took off to return to the landing zone for more casualties. Landing a second time as, once again, the German patrol and BM–70 delivered suppressive fire against the enemy fighters who were raking the area with deadly multi-caliber weapons discharges, the crew of DO–87 recovered another gravely wounded German soldier and flew him to Kunduz, this time accompanied by BM–70.

As soon as this casualty was offloaded, Red Baron notified LaCrosse that an improvised explosive device (IED) had just detonated at Isa Khel, severely damaging an allied vehicle and critically wounding four more German soldiers. LaCrosse called his command center and directed that the crew of DO–84, consisting of Captain McDonough, fellow pilot CWO3 Nelson Visaya, medic Sgt. Antonio Gattis, and crew chief Spec. Matthew Baker, prepare for takeoff to support the expanding effort. As the crewmen of DO–84 readied their equipment to join the mission, the two aircraft that had already been engaged in the evacuation lifted off and flew back to the battle zone and began to circle the area. At this point, four enemy fighters in a car discharged small-arms fire toward DO–87 and an RPG at BM–70 but failed to disable either craft. When an F–16 approached, the car drove into a compound with a garage, causing the Americans to refrain from attacking it for fear of hitting noncombatants.

Photo by a Belgian soldier, Collection of Jason LaCrosse

Sergeants Shumaker and Brown pursue their evacuation mission after the landing of Dustoff 87 at the embattled landing zone.

DO–84 then approached Isa Khel, having received ground fire from several locations en route. While the medevac aircraft maneuvered to avoid the threat, BM–70 provided suppressive fire.

Red Baron now reported that, because of the ongoing battle, the Germans were moving the wounded to an alternate landing zone, so they would not be ready for pickup for at least fifteen minutes. Observing the low fuel status of both DO–87 and BM–70, LaCrosse ordered all three craft to return to Kunduz to refuel. While on the ground there, the crew chiefs quickly inspected their aircraft for battle damage. Shumaker and LaCrosse observed that DO–87 had sustained some small-arms hits, but both concurred that the aircraft was still flightworthy. Once the helicopters were refueled, they returned to the alternate landing zone where the medevac teams recovered four more critically wounded German soldiers. As soon as the helicopters were loaded, the teams carried the wounded Germans to Kunduz.

Believing that the mission was complete, the crews shut down their aircraft, only to discover that all three had been damaged in the melee. Unfortunately, just a few minutes later, they were ordered into the air again to recover four more German soldiers wounded in a second IED blast. At this point, CWO4 Steven Husted replaced Chief Warrant Officer Wells and Spec. Gregory Martinez replaced Specialist Marchese in the crew of BM–70. Mercifully, the crews accomplished this mission without further incident, as the enemy fighters had begun to move away from the landing zone. The battle, however, went on for another six hours as the German forces continued to engage Taliban fighters in the area.

The last trip to Isa Khel provided a relatively quiet end to what had been a very busy day for the medevac crews. They had scrambled four times to recover a total of ten wounded allied soldiers. Unfortunately, three of the German

Information and Media Center of the Bundeswehr

The German Gold Cross for Valor

JMTC Grafenwöhr Public Affairs Office

Members of the helicopter crews reunite at Grafenwöhr with members of the German platoon they assisted, 11 November 2010.

soldiers—M. Sgt. Nils Bruns, Cpl. Martin Augustyniak, and Cpl. Robert Hartert—died of their wounds, making this the deadliest single combat engagement for German forces since World War II. Subsequently, the U.S. Army awarded LaCrosse a Silver Star for his actions in the fight and gave Distinguished Flying Crosses to each of the remaining crew members of Dustoff 87 and 84 and Black Magic 70. Germany also presented all of the crew members with its highly esteemed Gold Cross for Valor. To date, these soldiers are the only non-Germans who have been so honored.[4]

The team's effort represented the finest tradition of U.S. Army medical evacuation, performed as a brilliant act of allied cooperation. It was emblematic of the fact that the ISAF military mission in Afghanistan is truly a coalition effort, held together by a shared desire to defeat a common enemy and bring peace to that ravaged nation. The efforts of the members of these three crews honored the bonds of that alliance, the cornerstone of coalition warfare. They are true heroes all.

Notes

1. Address by Lt Col Robert Howe to the Dustoff Association, 20 Feb 2011, author's files. Information about the types of helicopters used in this operation is contained in Federation of American Scientists, "UH–60 Black Hawk, UH–60L Black Hawk, UH–60Q MEDEVAC, MH–60G Pave Hawk, HH–60G Pave Hawk, CH–60 Sea Hawk," posted at http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/rotary/sh60.html#uh60q.

2. After-action reports by CWO2 Jason Brown and CWO3 Jason Lacrosse, provided to the author by Capt Robert McDonough.

3. Ltr, German M Sgt Patrick Bonneik, joint terminal attack controller, to Lt Col Robert Howe, 5 Apr 2010, provided to the author by Capt Robert McDonough.

4. Dan Blottenberger, "Medevac Soldiers Honored for Their Heroism during Ceremony," *Stars and Stripes*, 13 Dec 2010; Dan Blottenberger and Marcus Kloeckner, " 'Like Flying into a Hornet's Nest,' " *Stars and Stripes*, 14 Jun 2011.

ARMY HISTORY

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Continued from page 3

Your boss does not know what you do. This one is vital to avoid. Soon after your arrival in a unit or after the arrival of a new supervisor, take time to sit down with your boss and educate him or her on your roles and functions as a historian. Chances are that you are the first historian who has ever worked for him or her; and unless you tell the person what you can contribute, your value will be immediately marginalized. From this first meeting, your goal should be to help your supervisor understand that you are a key player and contributor on the team. That you, the historian, have much to offer and that you are there to make him or her successful.

At this same meeting, it is a great idea to figure out what your boss expects of you. Do not put yourself in the position of the second precept: **you do not know what your boss wants you to do**. Although they may never have had a historian under their command, most leaders come with some expectations of you. Their expectations may or may not mesh with what you have in mind but try to accommodate them. It is important to make your boss understand that he or she can depend on you, even for some missions that may not be in "traditional" history lanes.

There is little narrative necessary on the next rule—**you do not provide value to your command.** If your presence adds no value to the war-fighting capability, training, or staff function efficiencies of your organization, it may be time to start looking for a new position on USAJOBS. In these fiscally challenging times, odds are that you may be one of the reduction "trade-offs."

Some historians feel that in order to serve the unit, they must remain a detached, neutral observer. They fall prey to the next rule—**you do not exemplify the spirit of your command, branch, or unit.** You must strive to become part of the organization. Learn about its history and traditions; be proud to be a member. Attend its social functions, including events such as formals, hail and farewells, or regimental balls. These opportunities prove you are a member of the team! If you fall into the trap of trying to be a "neutral" outsider, trust me, you will become just that—an outsider!

The next set of rules emphasizes the importance of being a part of the staff team and being a valued contributor to your organization. It can make or break you! The Toxic Historian is **not up-to-date on professional issues in his or her field(s); is a hedgehog (does only one thing), not a fox (does many things);** and is often **perceived to be a problem, not a problem solver.** These traits will cause your boss and the staff to avoid you at any cost. Do not be perceived as having only one function. Take on additional duties and use them as a springboard to move your history program forward. Smart staff officers take on jobs that they may not enjoy, but these tasks help them build their reputations as solid performers. While learning about the workings of the staff, stay current in your field. Use any opportunity that presents itself to interest those around you in history.

The next item on the list speaks to your stock and trade—the things you should love to do. If **you do not write annual histories, collect documents, or do interviews,** you have failed. No matter what echelon you work at, your charge is to document and collect for future generations of historians materials that they will use to write informed histories of the period in which you served. If you fail to accomplish this core task, you are an unsuccessful historian.

Finally, use the other history professionals to your advantage. For example, if you have a museum on post or one that is associated with the organization, develop joint programs to further your goals. The Toxic Historian unwisely **ignores museums and public outreach.** Historians are in the education business and museums are one of the best educational tools; likewise, many curators are experts on material culture but lack your expertise in placing objects into context. Working together as a team, you can ensure success for both your programs. Think "outside the box" and the results will amaze you!

Here is a short "war story" illustrating how an unconventional history team can garner amazing and lasting results.

A division history office was approached by the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) section and asked if it could provide any programs for African American History Month. Of course, all of you have been in this position.

Immediately, the office members went down the usual path, looking for a speaker for a luncheon event. During the course of the planning, the museum director mentioned that he knew of a 10th Cavalry "living history" group that did some school programs. According to the director, the group also did mounted demonstrations of period cavalry tactics. The EEO office had some funding to pay for a speaker, and the office was able to offer these funds to the group to offset moving its horses. So, for the same cost as the traditional luncheon speaker, the history office was now able to offer a much different program than in past years.

EEO office members set up a mounted cavalry platoon demonstration on the parade field, along with several first person talks focused on the life and challenges of Buffalo Soldiers. These talks were developed and approved in coordination with the EEO and history offices and well rehearsed with the "living historians." Finally, they coordinated with local schools and arranged visits to several middle and high school classes. The event now included several outreach programs, along with the traditional Army celebration.

In the end, the event attracted several thousand people, including several hundred schoolchildren. The division commander was thrilled, calling it the best EEO event he had ever seen. Needless to say, his next question to the history office focused on how such an event could be organized to celebrate the history of the division. That history office could do no wrong from that day forward. It had taken what many believed to be a burdensome tasking and turned it into an opportunity to excel!

In that commander's eyes, the historians were valuable, relevant members of his team. You must strive to be so too. Your success and survival depend on this, and our soldiers depend on you to be there to communicate their history and heritage to them. Do not be the Toxic Historian. Always be a key member of the staff.

Keep History Alive!

BOOKREVIEWS

U. S. Grant: American Hero American Myth



By Joan Waugh
University of North Carolina Press, 2009
Pp. x, 373. $30

Review by Thomas Bruscino

Joan Waugh, professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles, has focused much of her published work on Civil War memory, and she has put that background to good use in this reevaluation of the life and reputation of Ulysses S. Grant. Indeed, Waugh's main point is that any history of Grant has to look at both elements because his life has been filtered and refracted through his ever-shifting reputation. Waugh sorts out the biography and memory, and in the process adds something vital to the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century America.

U. S. Grant is divided into two broad parts—the first summarizes Grant's life, especially up through his presidency; the second covers his reputation, beginning with the tragic and triumphal story of the writing of his memoirs. The account of his presidency and shifting memory is especially welcome because Grant's post-military life has been woefully understudied by historians. That is not to say Waugh does not handle Grant's youth and military career well. In fact, she has provided a wonderful summary of that part of his life, deftly handling any number of controversies, military (e.g., his actions at Shiloh) and personal (e.g., his drinking) alike; undoubtedly relying on a much more developed literature, especially the first volume of Brooks Simpson's biography *Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822–1865* (New York, 2000).

When it comes to his presidency and reputation, historians and biographers have provided much less of a foundation, which makes her achievement so much greater. With only a few exceptions—Jean Edward Smith and Frank Scaturro, for example—the history of Grant's presidency has been dominated by the Lost Cause school of thought, which saw Reconstruction as a great evil and portrayed the Grant administration as ineffective and beset by corruption. Waugh works through the history and the interpretations of his presidency at the same time, and in so doing helps rehabilitate, without turning to hagiography, two terms of office that had difficulties but also plenty of high points. Yes, President Grant overly trusted his subordinates, which led to much of the corruption during his eight years in office, but he also maintained a strong vision of Reconstruction, initiated the peace policy toward Native Americans, and provided unifying national leadership when the nation desperately needed to be mended. It was no mistake that when he died the whole country went into mourning, if for somewhat varying meanings. The North lamented the loss of the winning general and man of the people president; the South celebrated the victor of Appomattox who had offered lenient terms to Robert E. Lee's defeated army.

In Grant's divided commemoration could be found the roots of the long twentieth century of his declining or even disappearing reputation, and that is the story Waugh tells best. Southerners who fought to win the history of the war and Reconstruction made Grant into one of the villains of their story, and Northerners who just wanted to reconcile and get on with life gave up trying to defend the fallen hero. The Grant who had been so celebrated at home and abroad, the Grant whose posthumously published memoirs became a runaway bestseller, the Grant who was memorialized all over the country but most prominently with a massive and expensive tomb in New York City, became over the course of the next century either a punch line or an afterthought. The winning general became a drunken butcher, the popular president became one of the most incompetent in all of American history, and the magnificent tomb for Grant and his beloved Julia became a target for graffiti and derision from urban intellectuals.

Waugh clearly believes that Grant deserves better, but the genius of her book is that it really does not matter what the historian believes. Grant deserves the truth, which cannot help but be better than what the myth has become. *U. S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth* is the best kind of history: it is a search for truth, and one that deserves the widest possible readership.

Thomas Bruscino is an associate professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is the author of *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along* (Knoxville, Tenn., 2010). He is currently at work on a biography of Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston.

Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals

By Clay Mountcastle
University Press of Kansas, 2009
Pp. x, 202. $29.95

Review by Paul E. Teed

Clay Mountcastle's book, *Punitive War*, makes an important contribution to recent debates over the physical destructiveness and social impact of the Civil War. The book's main thesis is that Union forces ultimately waged "punitive war" against the Confederacy, a style of warfare that targeted civilians and their property as a form of punishment rather than for their strategic value. Punitive war, the author argues, emerged from the Union military's ongoing problem with Confederate guerrilla activity, an issue that plagued federal operations in Missouri, along the Mississippi River, and in the Shenandoah Valley. Unable to develop a successful strategy to deal with the guerrilla threat, Union commanders adopted an increasingly harsh policy toward civilians that eventually culminated in the wholesale destructiveness of William T. Sherman's marches and Philip Sheridan's Valley campaign in 1864. In the course of the book, Mountcastle makes a persuasive case that the "guerrilla problem" was not a sideshow of the conflict, but rather a central factor in its evolution from conciliation to hard war.

In taking on the question of the Civil War's destructiveness, *Punitive War* consciously engages one of the most contentious issues in recent historiography. Historian Mark Grimsley is perhaps the best known advocate of the idea that Union soldiers' conduct toward southern civilians was generally marked by restraint. Commanders and troops alike, he has argued, shied away from "indiscriminate violence" toward noncombatants and their property. Echoing these views, historian Mark Neely has suggested that recent writers have been overly influenced by the "modern cult of violence" in their depictions of the Civil War (p. 145). Yet Mountcastle notes that other scholars, most notably Stephen Ash and Charles Royster, tell a different story. Both emphasize the evolution of Union military policies from conciliation toward harder, more destructive war in which property confiscations, forced evacuations, military arrests, and even civilian executions became legitimate practices. What distinguishes *Punitive War* from the works of these authors is its intensive examination of the ways in which hard war policies derived specifically from the vexing problem of Confederate guerrilla activities.

At the heart of Mountcastle's argument is that Union commanders ultimately responded to the persistence of guerrilla activity with a policy of "collective responsibility" (pp. 15–16). Unable to effectively track and defeat the irregular forces that harassed them, commanders held civilians accountable for guerrilla activities carried out in their vicinity. The burning of homes, barns, or even whole communities became a means by which to punish local populations for harboring or supporting irregulars and to deter them from doing so in the future. Although this approach to the guerrilla threat had been used against Native Americans during the Second Seminole War and in the Mexican American War, the American military had not employed it "against fellow white Americans" until the Civil War (p. 140). Vividly describing the Union Army's complete destruction of towns like Randolph, Tennessee, and Wytheville, Virginia, Mountcastle provides solid evidence that Union troops and their commanders were acting out of a passionate desire to punish civilians for their support of guerrillas rather than from a desire to deny resources to the Confederate Army. Often, he points out, punitive expeditions took place in regions where no regular Confederate military units were present.

In making his case for the importance of guerrilla activity to the larger evolution of hard war policies, Mountcastle argues that western operations and western commanders were crucial in setting the paradigm for collective responsibility. Commanders like John Pope, William T. Sherman, and Ulysses S. Grant, widely recognized as the architects of the Union's ultimate hard war strategy, began their Civil War careers in Missouri and the lower Mississippi Valley where guerrilla activity was endemic. In Missouri, for example, where partisan forces began wreaking havoc on critical infrastructure in 1861, Pope was the first to implement retaliatory measures against civilians, first with tax levies for property destroyed by guerrillas, and then with wholesale property confiscation. Willing to accept that such an approach would strike the innocent along with the guilty, Pope and his successors in Missouri adopted increasingly harsh policies toward civilians that culminated in the notorious General Orders No. 11, completely depopulating four counties along the western border with Kansas. Historians have long been aware of this action, but Mountcastle suggests that it can only be understood correctly as a punitive action in response to William Quantrill's raid on Lawrence, Kansas, in August 1863. The "depopulation of the region," he argues, "was conducted more out of passion and anger than out of military necessity" (p. 51).

If Pope brought antiguerrilla, hard war policies east, Mountcastle argues that Grant and Sherman did so as well. In 1862 and 1863, both commanders dealt with significant guerrilla threats in the Mississippi Valley region where Union operations were under constant attack from what soldiers called "bushwhackers." Prior to their famous marches through the Deep South, Sherman and his men had become practitioners of "retributive burning" in response to guerrillas. In September 1862, for example, when a Union

steamer was fired upon by guerrillas operating near the town of Randolph, Tennessee, Sherman ordered his troops to "destroy the place" (p. 75). Although Mountcastle agrees that the marches through Georgia and the Carolinas involved the larger strategic objective of destroying Confederate supplies and morale, he makes a strong case that antiguerrilla policies and the doctrine of collective responsibility prepared the commander and his men for the most destructive elements of the campaign. Their long struggles against a guerrilla threat they viewed as immoral and uncivilized allowed them to cast off restraint when dealing with a civilian population they blamed for supporting such activities.

By the final year of the war, the western commanders who had fought hardest against guerrillas had become the Union's main strategists. In Virginia, Grant and Sheridan now waged punitive war against civilians in the Old Dominion. They did so largely in response to guerrilla assaults orchestrated by Confederate cavalry Col. John S. Mosby in the Shenandoah Valley. Having clearly delineated the evolution of the collective responsibility policy, Mountcastle is successful in linking Sheridan's burning raids of Loudon and Fauquier Counties to the Department of Missouri commander, Maj. Gen. John Schofield's, General Orders No. 11, which had been carried out in parts of Missouri the previous year. He disagrees with historians who see Sheridan's 1864 campaign in the valley as part of a larger strategy to deny resources to the Confederate Army. He notes that Confederate Second Corps forces under Lt. Gen. Jubal Early had already been defeated and that the most devastated areas were separated from Robert E. Lee's Army by the Blue Ridge Mountains. Mountcastle insists that "Sheridan directly targeted guerrillas and their supposed supporters for the express purpose of punishing them" (p. 135).

Punitive War is a well-argued book, and it raises significant questions for those historians who seek to downplay the destructiveness of the Civil War. Although there is more material on the attitudes of commanders than of ordinary soldiers, it is clear that guerrilla activity led many in the ranks to throw off their scruples about the destruction of civilian property and lives. The famous Lieber Code (General Orders No. 100) distinguished between "partisans," who were protected by the laws of war, and "bushwhackers," who were not, but most Union soldiers regarded irregulars of any kind as reprehensible. Because they were often indistinguishable from and supported by the civilian population, moreover, the opprobrium that the troops attached to guerrillas spilled over onto noncombatants and justified punitive measures. If lingering concerns about the legitimacy of such measures can sometimes be detected in the letters of soldiers, Mountcastle rightly points out that such worries did not prevent the men from carrying out their orders. Indeed, doubts of this kind may have led them to underreport the level and extent of the damage they inflicted.

Perhaps the only significant weakness of *Punitive War* is its failure to analyze fully the cultural attitudes of the soldiers who carried out the actions it describes. Was it only the activities of guerrillas that led Union soldiers to feel justified in the destruction of homes, barns, and fields while women and children looked on in despair? Did officers and men see other things in Confederate civilians that allowed them to cross boundaries that would have been rigidly maintained in peacetime? In *When Sherman Marched North from the Sea* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003), for example, historian Jacqueline Campbell argues that Sherman's men carried with them a sense of cultural superiority that profoundly shaped their interactions with Confederate civilians and sometimes propelled their destructiveness. Their interactions with Confederate women were especially fraught with cultural misconceptions and deepened their image of the South as alien, threatening, and backward. Mountcastle's work would have benefited from more cultural analysis of this kind, exploring the impact of guerrilla activity on the soldiers' larger view of the South.

Nevertheless, *Punitive War* is a book that all students of the American Civil War will read with great profit. Engaging a central issue in the historical interpretation of the conflict, it does so with clarity and fresh evidence. The debate over the destructiveness of the Civil War will continue, but *Punitive War* has placed Confederate guerrillas and Union reprisals at the center of the discussion.

Paul E. Teed is professor of history and the honors program chair at Saginaw Valley State University. He is the author of *John Quincy Adams: Yankee Nationalist* (Hauppauge, N.Y., 2005) and has published essays in *Civil War History*, *Journal of the Early Republic*, and *American Studies*. He is currently completing a book on the transcendentalist and militant abolitionist Theodore Parker.

Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947



By Andrew M. Roe
University Press of Kansas, 2010
Pp. ix, 313. $34.95

Review by Clark Capshaw

Long before the United States began its adventure in Afghanistan, first by funding and backing the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* guerrillas

in the 1980s, and more recently in driving the Taliban from power and trying to stabilize a new Afghanistan, Britain had faced many of the same challenges in Waziristan—a Pashtun-dominated region on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that is likely the hiding place of Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

In the book's subtitle, the author employs the word *struggle* to describe Britain's century-long experience in this region. This usage reflects the common understanding among experts about how difficult it is for an outsider nation to attempt to operate in and control this semi-lawless region. Depending on how U.S. policymakers describe today's objectives in Afghanistan, this book may or may not be instructive. In no way could one construe Britain's experience as a "victory" in a conventional military sense, or in the terms that the United States might like to see an end to the Afghanistan conflict. That fact, plus Britain's failed quest to capture the infamous Pashtun guerrilla fighter called "the Fakir of Ipi," although Britain had employed up to 40,000 troops to the effort for more than ten years, bodes ill for the prospects of trying to capture Mullah Omar, who is likely to be hiding out in the exact same region and protected by the same cultural practices that gave sanctuary to the Fakir of Ipi for so long.

Despite this spectacular failure, the British were able to remain in the region for almost one hundred years and to contain one of the greatest sources of instability to its empire in India. If U.S. objectives are more modest for Afghanistan, then the lessons of this book may be much more useful in trying to end the present conflict.

Since Britain was able, for the most part, to maintain stability in this region, Roe observes that there are some noteworthy lessons for the United States. First, he notes that the British opted for a decentralized structure based on local tribes and situations in order to exert this control. "Due to the nuances of tribal behavior and evolving local conditions, a . . . political approach to each agency was customary. Political agents had to bargain continually and use varying political and economic levers to achieve a desired outcome. This localized approach, based on decentralized governance founded in tribal realities, proved relatively effective and contributed significantly to the region's stability" (p. 142).

Second, the British were able to use local tribesmen to form one of the more effective military units in its effort—the scouts. "The scouts—a resident political force that provided day-to-day security in the agencies—formed the second component of regional security. Comprised principally of tribesmen from the frontier districts and commanded by British officers, the scouts were a loyal, inexpensive, and efficient force. Decades of experience in tribal management led them to develop a distinctive style of frontier policing that held the region under reasonable control" (pp. 142–43).

Third, since Pashtun tribes occupy the regions of Waziristan referred to in this book as well as much of Afghanistan, a knowledge of *Pashtunwali*, or "the way of the Pashtuns," is invaluable for understanding and conducting the present Afghanistan conflict.

The discussion in Chapter 6 on the Royal Air Force was particularly fascinating and filled with lessons and parallels for the use of air power for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the region today. Issues that were identified sixty and seventy years ago remain relevant—the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants; the difficulty of balancing an aircraft's operational altitude with the aircraft's vulnerability and alerting enemy fighters on the ground because of aircraft noise; and the limits on the effective use of such aircraft due to weather and terrain. It was also extremely difficult to distinguish between hostile and peaceful villagers as well as government forces. "Their targets are tribesmen, who, clothed to assimilate to the exact colour of their background, and scattered in shapeless groups which have no clear outline either when halted or on the move, are all but indistinguishable at ground-level and quite invisible from a height" (p. 140).

Two full chapters are devoted to the elusive Pashtun guerrilla, the Fakir of Ipi (Mirza Ali Khan), who began a *jihadist* struggle against the British in the mid-1930s and who eluded capture by the British for more than ten years. He employed many of the same strategies that are now being employed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, both to evade capture and to keep opposing forces off balance.

Roe argues that successfully operating in this region requires some careful and detailed study—"to have any hope of successfully controlling and pacifying the Pashtun tribesmen requires a lifetime of specialist study" (p. 236). Roe himself is an expert on the region, having completed two master's theses plus a doctoral thesis on the area.

One of the issues that the author brings to the surface in the final chapter, "Contemporary Parallels and Prognostications," is the possibility of the reemergence of a movement for the establishment of an independent "Pashtunistan," consisting of ethnic Pashtuns from Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. The author views this prospect with strong pessimism; this is somewhat surprising given Roe's expertise and the objective nature of his book. He presumes that the emergence of such a state would by its very nature be radical and inclined to violence. Perhaps this is a justifiable position based on the history of Taliban-dominated Afghanistan during the 1990s, but it is possible—though not likely—that the job of trying to create a Pashtun nation-state might be the very thing that is needed for the tribes

to begin to enter the modern world. The key question is, would such a state follow the path of increasing isolation like North Korea, or that of greater engagement with the world like Vietnam? This question is certainly worth exploring, and a somewhat disappointing omission by an author with so much detailed knowledge of the region and culture.

Dr. Clark Capshaw is an operations research analyst with United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. He previously worked for the Army Test and Evaluation Command in Alexandria, Virginia, as an evaluator of aerial intelligence systems. He also was a Peace Corps volunteer in Gabon, Africa, and an international volunteer for Habitat for Humanity in Indonesia. He received his Ph.D. in higher education leadership from Vanderbilt University in 2007 and also holds advanced degrees in aerospace engineering and business administration.

Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915

By Graydon A. Tunstall
University Press of Kansas, 2010
Pp. ix, 258. $29.95

Review by Harold Allen Skinner

During the First World War, the American Expeditionary Forces suffered roughly 323,000 casualties, a total that pales in comparison to the other major combatants. The Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies each suffered a million casualties in the four-month Carpathian winter campaign of 1914–1915, surpassing the death toll for the better known battles of the Somme and Verdun. The campaign profoundly affected the subsequent course of the war in the East, and ultimately the fates of the Romanov and Habsburg dynasties. Despite the horrible casualty numbers and profound strategic implications, the Carpathian campaign remains poorly chronicled in Western historiography. In *Blood on the Snow*, Graydon Tunstall thoroughly chronicles the details of this forgotten struggle. Tunstall does a credible job in describing the strategic picture and campaign planning from the Habsburg perspective by drawing heavily from Austro-Hungarian primary source documents in the state archives. The narrative lacks similar clarity from the Russian perspective, likely due to the scarcity of primary source materials from the czarist regime. Tunstall compensates by using secondary German and Austrian sources, supplemented by a handful of memoirs from former czarist officers, to detail the Russian side.

Following the outbreak of war in August 1914, the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, sent the bulk of the prewar army to crush Serbia before the Russians could fully mobilize. Stalemated, Hötzendorf foolishly launched an ill-timed and poorly coordinated offensive into Russian-controlled Poland. In response, the Russians unleashed a powerful counteroffensive, which occupied Galicia and surrounded the key Przemyśl fortress. Humiliated, Hötzendorf reorganized his armies in order to halt Russian incursions into the Hungarian heartland, then retake Galicia and relieve Przemyśl. Since Hötzendorf needed to relieve the fortress before starvation decimated the garrison, the planning for the operation was hasty and incomplete. Furthermore, Hötzendorf faced strong pressure from his German allies as well as the Habsburg emperor to produce a victory to forestall Italian or Romanian intervention. In contrast, the Russian *Stavka* (Supreme Headquarters) desired Galicia only to secure the flank of their main effort, the invasion of East Prussia. Accordingly, the *Stavka* directed the Southwest Front commander, General Nikolay Iudovich Ivanov, to secure Galicia and keep Przemyśl surrounded. Instead, Ivanov seized the Carpathian mountain passes, intending to invade Hungary before Hötzendorf could reorganize the polyglot Austro-Hungarian army.

By December 1914, the stage was set for a tragic collision of conscript armies fighting under appalling conditions in the inhospitable Carpathian range. Striking first in January 1915, Hötzendorf attempted to unhinge Russian defenses and relieve Przemyśl. Ivanov counterattacked, expecting to outflank the Austro-Hungarian defenses and invade Hungary. Both Ivanov and Hötzendorf relied on the element of surprise to overcome enemy resistance. Therefore, neither commander made adequate organizational or logistical preparations prior to launching their attacks; the result was utter disaster.

The Austro-Hungarian army sustained over 800,000 casualties during the campaign, in addition to the 120,000 troops taken prisoners when Przemyśl surrendered in March 1915. The defeat profoundly weakened Austro-Hungarian prestige and strength, leaving the army permanently reliant on German aid. Despite the failure, Hötzendorf remained chief of staff until his demotion in 1916 following his botched response to the Russian's Brusilov offensive. Ivanov's aggressive pursuit of the offensive, although tactically successful, ultimately proved disastrous to the czarist regime by leaving the Russians exhausted and overextended in Galicia. The unrelenting Russian pressure on the Austro-Hungarian forces prompted a surprise German counteroffensive in East Prussia—the Battle of the Masurian Lakes—which halted the Russian's main effort in the East. Furthermore, Ivanov's continued insistence on invading Hungary exercised a malignant influence on Russian strategy by distracting the czar and the *Stavka* from the more dangerous German threat. In May 1915, the Germans unleashed a crushing blow against the

weakened Russian Army, recaptured Przemyśl, and cleared Galicia in the greatest German offensive of the war. The Gorlice-Tarnow campaign cost the Russians over 750,000 casualties, large quantities of irreplaceable war materiel, and the loss of hundreds of square miles of productive farmland. Ivanov was sacked by the czar for his incompetence, but the damage done was profound and heavily contributed to the subsequent collapse of the Russian war effort.

Tunstall convincingly makes the point that neither side fully grasped the complexities of winter campaigning and failed to fully account for the strategic implications of their actions. However, the author arrives at several conclusions without providing thoughtful analysis to substantiate his claims. For example, Tunstall criticizes the Austrian-Hungarian reliance on (ultimately fruitless) frontal assaults to penetrate Russian defenses quickly. Tunstall argues that Hötzendorf could have resorted to flanking attacks but fails to outline how the Austro-Hungarian army could realistically have executed flank attacks in restricted and snowbound Carpathian terrain. Second, Tunstall castigates Hötzendorf for suborning his entire strategy to the relief of Przemyśl. Here Tunstall fails to thoroughly analyze other strategic options available to Hötzendorf, most notably a strategic defense in the Carpathians, coupled with a fresh offensive against Serbia. He details the strategic debates between Hötzendorf and the German Army chief of staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, in which Falkenhayn insisted Hötzendorf concentrate on destroying the Serbs, a victory that would restore Habsburg prestige in addition to opening supply lines to Turkey. Unfortunately, Tunstall fails to critically explore the feasibility of the Serbian option compared to Hötzendorf's strategy of relieving Przemyśl. Third, Tunstall notes Hötzendorf's failure to mass sufficient combat power at decisive points, yet fails to offer thorough analysis as to how Hötzendorf could have done better, given the appalling weather conditions and the lack of improved roads and tactical transport.

Besides the flawed analysis, Tunstall's book was poorly edited with many passages containing unrelated or extraneous sentences. The reviewer found several instances of repetitive text, confusing dates, and discrepancies in unit details, leading to the conclusion that the editor did not thoroughly read the final draft before publication. Particularly annoying was Tunstall's frequent statement that a unit "must" accomplish some task, without outlining who determined the need behind the "must." Tunstall's inordinate, although admirable, focus on the suffering of the common soldier, an issue he admits to in his introduction, and the excessive repetition of minor details, detracts from the flow of the text.

Tunstall's book suffers from other organizational oversights. His narrative failed to clearly reference the included maps, which inhibited the reader's visualization of the campaign. Furthermore, the book failed to clearly define several key terms. For example, the creation of "March brigades" was a part of the Habsburg reorganization effort. Tunstall failed to detail the composition of the March brigades, or make a contrast with earlier brigade structures. Tunstall also neglected to define the term "White Death," noting it was a prime cause of noncombat casualties but leaving the reader ignorant of the exact meaning. The book should have included a separate glossary, in addition to appendixes that detail the order of battle and force structure.

For readers used to top-notch military history titles published by the University Press of Kansas, Tunstall's book is a disappointment. Judicious rewriting and careful editing could have transformed *Blood on the Snow* into the definitive history of the Carpathian offensive of 1914–1915.

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Churchill and His Generals



By Raymond Callahan
University Press of Kansas, 2007
Pp. x, 310. $34.95

Review by Harold E. Raugh Jr.

The British Army bore the lion's share of allied land combat from the beginning of World War II in September 1939 until months after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the Americans entered the conflagration. The crucible of combat forced the British Army to transform under fire from a role of "imperial policing" (p. 17) and being slow and reactive to a "tactically and operationally sophisticated fighting force" (p. 5) in 1944–1945, consisting of three field armies fighting in northwest Europe, Italy, and Burma. As prime minister of Great Britain from May 1940 until the summer of 1945, Winston Churchill was ultimately responsible for the transformation and higher direction of the British Army. His relationships with his generals—the focus of this study—were often tense, with Churchill frequently doubting the qualities and second-guessing the decisions of his generals, while the latter were (especially in postwar memoirs) critical of his leadership.

Author Raymond Callahan is professor emeritus of history at the University of Delaware. His previous books include *The Worst Disaster: The Fall of Singapore* (Newark, N.J., 1977), *Burma, 1942–1945* (Newark, N.J., 1979), and *Churchill: Retreat from Empire* (Wilmington, Del., 1984). He begins this book by describing

the tactics, doctrine, equipment, and personnel of the largely conservative British Army, and how they evolved, from the end of the Great War to the advent of World War II. In describing the officer "class," it is noted that the "dominance of the titled and landed classes over the army had faded before World War I . . ." (p. 19), a somewhat dubious claim. The officers are said to have collectively formed "the cult of gentlemanly amateurism" (p. 21), characterized by, among other features, "intellectual torpor" (p. 19). This appears to be a generalization, as the author seems to realize when he writes "one must be cautious about correlating social history with battlefield performance" (p. 21).

"The British Army's encounters with the Wehrmacht in 1940 and 1941," writes the author, "were brief and unsuccessful, ending either with the Royal Navy at great cost collecting soldiers, minus their heavy equipment, off open beaches or in disorganized retreat or surrender" (p. 23). The second chapter highlights the ill-fated British campaign in Norway (April–June 1940), the fighting and evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from France (May–June 1940), and the structural changes in the machinery for war direction made by Churchill when he became prime minister. These changes included establishing the position of minister of defense—with Churchill appointing himself to the position.

As the British Army retrained and reequipped at home, the focus of the war effort shifted to the Middle East. The first British commander in chief, Middle East, was General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, who served in this position from 1939 to July 1941. The evolution of his strained relationship with Churchill, and his campaigns in North Africa, Greece, and Crete, are described in Chapter 2. Wavell's campaigns in Italian East Africa, Iraq, and Syria—all highly successful—are not covered, perhaps the result of a misunderstanding of the tremendous paucity of resources as compared to active operations in the Middle East, especially from mid-1940 to mid-1941, or because they did not directly involve German troops.

Wavell was succeeded by General Sir Claude Auchinleck in July 1941. The latter's focus and resources were then largely devoted to combating Erwin Rommel's forces in North Africa. This seesaw campaign, beginning with the British Operation Crusader in November 1941; Rommel's second offensive in January 1942, which culminated in the capture of Tobruk (21 June 1942); and Auchinleck's operations that halted the Germans at the First Battle of El Alamein, July 1942, are well chronicled in Chapters 3 and 4. An important aspect of these chapters is the description of British efforts to develop and execute effective armor-infantry combined arms tactics. The examination of Churchill's relationship with the chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, first General Sir John Dill (May 1940–December 1941), followed by General Sir Alan Brooke (after December 1941) is also a highlight of these chapters.

General Sir Harold Alexander replaced Auchinleck as commander in chief, Middle East, in August 1942, at the same time Lt. Gen. Bernard Montgomery assumed command of Eighth Army. By this time, the tide of war was beginning to turn, as more American troops and supplies were becoming available to participate in and support operations. Callahan revisits and surveys British military operations and transformation in North Africa, 1942–1943, in Chapter 5, and in Italy in the following chapter, with a considerable part of the narrative examining the enigmatic Alexander's generalship.

This book then shifts to the other side of the globe and examines in Chapter 7 the operations of Lt. Gen. Sir William Slim and his "forgotten" Fourteenth Army in Burma, 1943–1944. The author reviews the military operations in this secondary theater and suggests they were little appreciated or recognized at the time because the focus of Churchill's overall strategy was, realistically, the defeat of Germany, and the necessity for Great Britain to make a significant contribution to Hitler's demise in order to maintain an important postwar position. Callahan unabashedly claims that Slim was "the finest British general of the twentieth century" (p. 188) and that his 1944–1945 Burma operations were "the most remarkable feat of arms to take place under the British flag during the war" (p. 188).

The penultimate chapter, 8, is entitled "Three Victories," and surveys British military operations during the final year of the war. The role of Churchill and his generals in the operations of the British Second Army in Normandy and northwest Europe, of the Eighth Army in Italy, and of the Fourteenth Army in Burma, are examined. While the Second Army (of Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group) played a secondary role to the Americans in northwest Europe, Callahan asserts that Second Army's performance in Normandy was lackluster, due to fatigue, inexperience, and doctrinal and training deficiencies. The polyglot Eighth Army, which spearheaded the final offensive in Italy, although by this time a considerably marginalized theater, "displayed considerable tactical skill, producing first a breakthrough and then a vigorous exploitation" (p. 224). In Burma, however, according to the author, Slim conducted "the finest operational maneuver of the war by a British general" (p. 213). Callahan again lauds Slim's leadership and the Fourteenth Army's successes in Burma, but notes they were overshadowed by the campaigns in Europe.

The study concludes with a short summary chapter entitled "Winston and His Generals," in which the author opines: "The British Army's military performance in the twilight of Britain's power was as good as could be expected, given the situation and the nature of the instrument, whereas the Indian Army's performance was astonishing" (p. 240).

Callahan, a historian of the British Empire, has also served on the Board of Governors of the Association of Churchill Fellows. As a result, one may question from the tone of the writing and conclusions reached if the author's unmistakable admiration for the wartime prime minister (and the British Indian Army) may have had an impact on his objectivity and balance.

While stylistically this book is nicely written, the notes reveal that limited research for this study was conducted in primary sources, and the book seems at times to be little more than a synthesis of postwar memoirs of senior generals, some disgruntled, who wanted to institutionalize their own versions of history. These are frequently juxtaposed with excerpts or information from Churchill's own notoriously self-serving postwar memoirs, with an occasional flash of insightful analysis. A four-page "A Note on Further Reading" follows the endnotes, and the author's annotations on various sources at times contradict what other historians have written about these same books. A visual dimension to the book is provided by ten monochrome illustrations of the book's leading protagonists. As this book chronicles, frequently in detail, military operations in various theaters around the globe, a major and noticeable shortcoming is the total absence of maps.

Churchill and His Generals is an interesting study of military leadership and army transformation while engaged in unprecedented active military operations. Perhaps the value of this generally well-written book is to show, through the experiences of the British Army in World War II, the indispensable importance of the primacy of civilian control of a nation's armed forces and of the requirement to maintain effective civil-military relations between the home government and commanders in the field. As such this study has tremendous relevance today.

Dr. Harold E. Raugh Jr. is the command historian with V Corps in Wiesbaden, Germany, and previously served as the command historian with the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, California. A retired U.S. Army infantry lieutenant colonel, he is the author or editor of eleven works of military history, including *Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship* (London, 1993).

Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front, 1942–1945



By Boris Gorbachevsky
Translated and Edited by Stuart Britton
University Press of Kansas, 2008
Pp. xix, 453. $36.95

Review by Victoria Campbell

Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front, 1942–1945 by Boris Gorbachevsky is the third such memoir translated and edited by Stuart Britton.[1] It complements the previous two memoirs (see dual book review in *Army History* No. 72, Summer 2009, pp. 52–53) by focusing on the front-line experiences of a combat Komsomol (Communist Union of Youth) organizer. Once again, Britton has selected a work that not only brings to life the daily experiences of a Soviet soldier on the Eastern Front, but also provides a window into Soviet society during the struggle to defend the Motherland.

Gorbachevsky's memoir is unique in that he writes from the perspective of both participant and historian, oscillating between his memories of the past and his commentary from the benefit of hindsight and research. He sets out to correct the historical record about several battles on the Eastern Front, presenting the battle of Smolensk as setting the stage for the Red Army's victory in the battle of Moscow, and questioning the battle for Koenigsburg's reputation as "one of the most shining operations in . . . the Great Patriotic War" (p. 379). While Gorbachevsky consciously references other memoirs and historians' interpretations of events in his work, this framework serves to strengthen his account and lends a more scholarly background than one might expect in a memoir. Britton's touch is thus the lightest in this work, serving mainly to augment Gorbachevsky's information about the enemy he faced. It is a credit to Gorbachevsky's writing abilities that his memoir contains so much valuable historical background, yet remains engaging and accessible to a wide range of readers in his presentation of daily life on the Eastern Front.

An ethnic Jew, Gorbachevsky represents himself as a patriot, but one who challenged authority and accepted practices. He describes learning tactics in the Tiumen Infantry School as a matter of memorizing regulations, a frequently observed criticism of the Soviet Army, and expresses frustration that in 1942 there was no discussion of the Red Army's failures. Gorbachevsky returns to the theme of tempering regulations with reality frequently in discussions with others, giving his reader a sense that individuals within the Red Army were not as blind and inflexible about the application of doctrine as scholars have suggested. Although he criticizes Stalin's purges and the cult of personality, Gorbachevsky also presents the startling observation that Stalin's famous Order No. 227, "Not One Step Back," was justified and necessary. He did not hesitate to criticize commanders or fellow political officers who took advantage of their position at the cost of their troops. Occasionally, his outspokenness resulted in clashes with commanders and reassignments; however, Gorbachevsky was always able to find someone to support him and find another job in which to serve. The freedom with which he was able to defy convention was likely a result of the greater liberties Soviet citizens experienced during the war; however, his candor and unusual approach to his job as

Komsomol organizer ensure that his account will keep readers guessing about what Gorbachevsky might do next.

While his memoir is valuable for providing a sense of life as a front-line political officer, he also addresses topics that are absent or obscured in official Soviet accounts, such as the role of religion in the lives of soldiers in the Red Army, desertion, and retribution toward the Germans. It will come as a great surprise to most readers that Gorbachevsky, an atheist and Communist Party member, not only sympathized with religious believers but openly defended them and their faith. Although his attitude was influenced by the combat situation, it also allows the reader to see Gorbachevsky as a free-thinking individual rather than one unquestioningly bound by party ideology. He also challenges the official history concerning the belief of all Soviet citizens in the eventual victory of the Red Army, stating that the Red Army actually lost between 150 to 200 soldiers daily to desertion and had great difficulty mobilizing men to fight in newly liberated areas of the Soviet Union, even after the German losses at Kursk and Stalingrad. As a political officer responsible for the morale and political education of his unit, Gorbachevsky was in a unique position to assess the motivations and states of mind of those he served with. He also addresses retribution toward the Germans, stating that vengeful propaganda and Nazi atrocities committed on Soviet territory led military leaders and political officers to allow, and even encourage, Soviet soldiers to act as they wished upon entering Germany. Beyond providing an understanding of the true nature of life in the Red Army, Gorbachevsky's detailed discussion of such events and their postwar official interpretations continues the work begun by Issak Kobylanskiy and Nikolai Litvin in filling the gaps in the historical record.

Although much of Gorbachevsky's account of life in the field is similar to the other two memoirs translated and edited by Britton, he also offers new material of interest to military and social scholars alike. His treatment of the introduction of a female sniper unit is particularly interesting, especially when contrasted with other accounts of women at the front lines of the Red Army. The challenges the women faced in living and working with their male comrades, and the way in which they accomplished their mission, were clearly of interest to Gorbachevsky and make for fascinating reading, since most only know of Soviet female snipers from fictional accounts. He also presents an engaging description of life in postwar Germany and his discussions with German clergy, civil leaders, and a young German woman with whom he strikes up a close friendship. His readers will be left with the sense that nothing was as black and white as Cold War accounts might suggest and will gain a richer understanding of one man's experience with the "meat-grinder" of the Soviet side of the Eastern Front. Masterful and balanced, Gorbachevsky's account is a must-read for scholars of the Eastern Front and those interested in the role of the Communist Party in the Red Army during World War II.

Note

1. Nikolai Litvin, *800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II*, ed. Stuart Britton (Lawrence, Kans., 2007); Issak Kobylyanskiy, *From Stalingrad to Pillau: A Red Army Artillery Officer Remembers the Great Patriotic War*, ed. Stuart Britton (Lawrence, Kans., 2008).

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Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War

By Ron Milam
University of North Carolina Press, 2009
Pp. xv, 238. $35

Review by Gregory A. Daddis

Ron Milam begins his excellent study of the U.S. Army's junior officer corps in the Vietnam War by expressing "disdain and disgust regarding some policies in place from 1964 until 1968" (p. 2). Readers thus may wonder if this work's conclusions stem from animosity against senior officers or from dispassionate historical analysis. The author, a wartime infantry adviser to Montagnard forces, champions his fellow veterans as he takes aim at the faulty image of lieutenants in Vietnam as "bumbling idiots who exhibited poor leadership" (p. 3) and who partly were responsible for the American defeat in Southeast Asia. Milam, however, also serves as an assistant professor of military history at Texas Tech University, and his extensive archival research reveals seriousness in depicting accurately the skill and commitment of junior officers in Vietnam.

At its core, *Not a Gentleman's War* aims to prove that the infamous Lt. William Calley was more unique than representative of U.S. Army lieutenants who served in Vietnam. Calley, convicted of murder for the 1968 My Lai massacre, is the fulcrum upon which Milam's analysis hinges. The lieutenant's crimes became "the defining moment in the military's criticism of the junior officer corp [*sic*]" (p. 126). If Calley hardly lived up

to Washingtonian ideals of an officer and a gentleman, Milam notes that Vietnam itself was not a "gentleman's war." He argues that Vietnam was not fought or managed as a "gentleman's war," that neither body counts nor rules of engagement were "gentlemanly," that the enemy's decision to avoid conventional tactics somehow made the war less "gentlemanly." One wonders, however, what in fact constitutes a gentleman's war. Milam never says.[1] Still, the author argues persuasively that those junior officers fighting in Vietnam did so with "great skill, dedication, and commitment to the men they led" (p. 2). If the war was no less gentlemanly than say the 1944 fighting on Pelelieu or the 1863 slaughter at Antietam, Milam succeeds in demonstrating the proficiency and steadfastness of the Army's lieutenants who fought in Vietnam.

Milam analyzes these young officers in two broad areas—their training and preparation for combat in the United States and their experiences in Vietnam. The strength of *Not a Gentleman's War* lies within the chapters on officer selection, education, and training. Here Milam argues that the Army genuinely was concerned with procuring college-educated officers who could lead in a complicated, oftentimes ambiguous, unconventional war. Assessing the three main commissioning sources—the United States Military Academy (USMA), the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and the Officer Candidate School (OCS)—Milam contends that senior Army officials grasped the importance of recruiting candidates who possessed both aptitude and potential in academics, physical ability, and leadership. More importantly, the Army adjusted its training and education programs to ensure graduates could meet the demands of a war that often involved solving local economic, social, and political problems. West Point, a traditional engineering school, "began to recognize that combat platoon leaders needed an academic background that included social sciences such as psychology and sociology, and that communication skills best learned in English and literature courses were vital to the group dynamics of the platoon" (p. 31). The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 equally sought to improve the quality of junior officer education.

While USMA and ROTC wrestled with academic relevancy during the war, the rapid expansion of OCS posed a thornier problem. The Army commissioned roughly 50 percent of its wartime officers through OCS and constructing an effectual selection and training model for these candidates proved daunting. Milam quotes one OCS brigade commander who distilled the "multitude of qualities . . . considered most important for effective combat leadership: ability to lead by example, dependability, moral courage, and judgment" (p. 46). Evaluating the output of programs like OCS on such subjective matters obviously proved difficult, though Milam maintains that the Army was satisfied with its ability to measure candidate performance. Still, training could do only so much and Army officials could evaluate only so well. As Milam correctly notes, "Calley handled the pressure of OCS to the satisfaction of his TAC [tactical] and company officers, but he could not respond properly in combat" (p. 49).

Combat forms the groundwork for the second part of *Not a Gentleman's War*. Milam begins with a solid overview of officer training in Vietnam, detailing unit orientation programs aimed at preparing incoming lieutenants with the basics for survival and successful combat platoon leadership. Interestingly, these programs rested on the widespread belief that junior officers only needed classes on adapting to a jungle environment since training in the United States had provided lieutenants with all other necessary skills. Of course, more than just jungle fighting comprised the war in Vietnam. Unfortunately, Milam himself neglects this important point. In oversimplifying Army strategy as a "search-and-destroy, free-fire zone, body-count, war-of-attrition policy," the author focuses his analysis solely on combat (p. 111). There is little to no discussion on how junior officers dealt with the complex missions of pacification, civic action, population security, and the training of South Vietnamese armed forces. A myopic view of the war forces the reader's attention to body counts, rules of engagement, and atrocious behavior without complementing these aspects of Vietnam with the political struggle of the village war in which so many young officers fought.

Milam, however, does highlight the dilemma junior officers faced in enforcing Army policies on race relations and drug use. In an intriguing passage, Milam speaks of lieutenants saving "leadership capital" for times when their troops stood down, arguing that "leading men in a garrison was more challenging than leading them on a combat patrol into enemy territory" (p. 149). If studies of the war written in the early 1970s devalued the ways in which junior officers met these leadership challenges in Vietnam, Milam certainly has taken a step in the right direction by revising what was a flawed version of the Army's company-grade leadership. Vietnam War scholarship over the last fifteen to twenty years suggests that Milam's research and findings rest on solid ground, and thus may not be as revisionist as the author claims. Still, this work is a useful corrective to those histories denigrating the contributions of junior officers in Vietnam and a solid contribution of collective biography. In the end, surely Milam is correct in arguing that there was only one William Calley serving in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War.

Note

1. John Keegan has argued that "for killing to be gentlemanly, it must take place between gentlemen." See *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1976), p. 316.

Col. Gregory A. Daddis is an academy professor in the Department of History at the United States Military Academy and is the author of *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War* (New York, 2011).

When Janey Comes Marching Home: Portraits of Women Combat Veterans

By Laura Browder
Photographs by Sascha Pflaeging
University of North Carolina Press, 2010
Pp. x, 157. $35

Review by Bobby A. Wintermute

The product of a gallery exhibition at the Visual Arts Center of Richmond, *When Janey Comes Marching Home* offers a unique perspective on the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Built around the oral histories and portraits of forty-eight servicewomen from all branches of service, active and reserve, this coffee-table-style book forges an insightful look at the multiple challenges women face in today's military that exceeds first expectations. As Laura Browder notes in the introduction to the study, in a setting in which over 14 percent of the military is now female, amid a pair of uncommonly violent asymmetrical wars, the time is long overdue for American society to reassess its conventional wisdom regarding perceived gender divisions in service. Her interviews, along with Sascha Pflaeging's portraiture, provide the foundation of a new narrative that "could add dimension to the often flawed or fragmentary representations of women soldiers in popular culture: [where] they too often appear as novelties, not as real soldiers" (p. 2).

Browder's narrative flow betrays her background as an English literature professor (at Virginia Commonwealth University). Instead of presenting each interview subject as an independent actor, as done in other recent oral history collections, such as Kirsten Holmstedt's *Band of Sisters: American Women at War in Iraq* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 2007), Browder slices the collective experiences of her subjects into eleven distinct chapters. Topics, such as recruitment, deployment, relationships with local inhabitants, individual faith and spirituality, motherhood, the toll on relationships, coming home, and of course, the mission itself, are all presented in turn. As a result, the individuality of each servicewoman's experience is emphasized in response to the specific question at hand and stands out in comparison with her peers. This editorial method presents at the same time an in-depth examination of important points while allowing each woman to retain her own voice, fulfilling in many ways the objective and ambition of all oral historians, in using their subjects' voice to provide insight into broader topics.

Sascha Pflaeging's photography adds another layer of humanity to the narratives. The book is flush with full-color photographs of each interview subject. Most subjects appear in uniform, imbuing them all with a pride and dignity until now reserved for male subjects in wartime photography. Some of the photographs bespeak of a sense of relief with the end of deployment; others portray their subjects in determined, almost recruiting-poster-like visages, with clenched jaw and eyes focused ahead on an unseen object. But the most powerful images exhibit the same vulnerability and isolation common with the best war portraits of the last century. Like their companion oral histories, there is no wasted effort or space; and the project as a whole benefits from these images.

In addition to the interviews and portraiture, Browder includes a short introduction to the issues associated with societal expectations of gender identity as related to military service, including the collision between historical limitations on military service (and the highly publicized exceptions of cross-dressing martial females before the twentieth century) and the dramatic contingencies of Iraq and Afghanistan. The greatest challenge, she avers, has been for women in military service to deemphasize their sexuality in a hypermasculine environment. Trash-talking, sexual harassment, illicit consensual sex, and rape remain factors that servicewomen confront even now, as much as an imagined moral consequence for women who fail to measure up to a predetermined, neutered ideal as a real event. However, taken in balance with the rest of the book, the introduction is more of a near miss. By attempting a historical contextualization of the female military experience with the real concerns and problems confronting American servicewomen in the current conflict, Browder falls short in doing proper justice to either situation. One potential remedy could have been a separate narrative-based chapter on the historical context; another might have been short narrative interludes and introductions within each chapter.

Nevertheless, *When Janey Comes Marching Home* is a very dramatic and significant book. More than any other oral history collection of its type, it provides a value-free assessment of life in wartime for female soldiers. Along the way, it constructs a holistic view of the cultural and individualized experiences of its subjects that is worthy of comparison with other first-rate oral military history collections. The book is essential both for serious scholars of the current conflict and for historians of gender relations in American society.

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The Chief Historian's Footnote

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

Collection to Publication: Historical Sausage Making

The preparation of historical publications from the raw material of history (documents, interviews, oral histories, journalist accounts, after-action reports, etc.) is never a pretty sight. It takes a lot of hard work and persistence to sift through hundreds, sometimes thousands, of primary and secondary sources and take notes on them to extract the important points. Those notes must then be shuffled, organized, and digested in an attempt to discern a credible narrative. And then a historian may spend hundreds or thousands of additional hours sitting in front of a typewriter or computer screen to turn those organized notes into sentences, paragraphs, chapters, and eventually a completed manuscript. The comparison of writing history for the Army to making laws or sausages is apt; it's not pretty to watch. However, the final product is generally very good and always necessary to the Army we serve.

The waters are muddied further for historians of current military operations since they either do their own collecting of primary sources (sometimes deploying in person to a theater of operations and gathering documents and interviews) or rely on military history detachments (MHDs), unit historians, or other field historians to do their collecting for them. And those field historians often just do the collecting and initial sorting—they seldom write a narrative themselves. So they sometimes ask us back at the Center, "What happens to all that stuff we send back? How does it get processed, sorted, and used to create Army history? How important is what we do?" These are good questions, and I will try to answer them, albeit in general terms, since the preparation of each historical work can be as unique as the historian assigned to it.

MHDs and unit historians collect documents, these days mostly in electronic form; conduct oral history interviews; and take some photographs. All of these materials are generally stored on removable hard drives or some other external storage device that can hold up to one or two terabytes of data. Excluding any duplicate material or larger than necessary image files, the MHDs and field historians generally collect between a hundred and three hundred gigabytes of useful, raw historical data during a yearlong deployment. This material is carried or sent to the Center of Military History's archives, the keeper of record of all MHD-collected data, where it is immediately copied onto magnetic tape. This provides security in case something happens to make the computer hard drive unreadable, and it serves to capture a pristine copy of the data as the MHD or field historian organized it.

The Center's archivists then download the data to a classified server (most contemporary military documents collected are classified) to begin some rudimentary sorting and organizing. They eliminate personal files, duplicate materials, obviously corrupted items, and empty folders, knowing that they have retained a backup just in case they inadvertently delete something of value. They impose a basic order on the material to assist researchers to determine where to begin their examination of a subject. This often involves little more than ensuring that files collected on a given unit are placed in the proper unit file and arranged in order, first by time and place collected and then by specific MHD or field historian. No sophisticated topical index or finding aid can be produced this early in the process, but at least a historian can find similar and related material in one specific place with most of the extraneous files eliminated. It's a start.

Oral histories are handled a little differently. Often arriving in .wav or .mp3 format, the interview files are kept separate to the extent possible so that, in time, they can be downloaded individually to removable media and sent to contactors for transcription. Sometimes the interviews arrive at the Center on a hard drive containing classified documents and thus must be treated as if they were classified as well. This slows transcription, since only a few contractors are authorized to handle classified materials, and the fees for their services are higher. Still, until the interviews are transcribed, they are not very useful to historians either at the Center or elsewhere, because they cannot easily be scanned for relevant data. And until they are transcribed, printed, and determined to be unclassified, they cannot be viewed by journalists or historians lacking the requisite clearances.

After the documentary material is roughly sorted, Center historians will begin to look at it to see what may be relevant to their current research project. The Center's Histories Division has a Contemporary Studies Branch whose members are researching operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The historians in that branch use this collected material to prepare pamphlets, short studies, information papers, and monographs. Similarly, historians with the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth use the material in writing monographs on current operations. In both cases, these are very preliminary studies of operations, often focused on small-unit combat action. The Center's *Tip of the Spear* and CSI's study of the Battle of Wanat are good examples. The studies issued by the Center are drafted, peer reviewed, redrafted, and sent up the chain for successive review by the author's branch and division chiefs and then by me as chief historian. I review them for quality, relative thoroughness, and conformity with accepted historical standards and methods. These contemporary studies are not expected to be comprehensive or definitive, since they are based on only the relative handful of documents collected by the MHDs and field historians. Yet I will still send the drafts to contemporary military officers and other knowledgeable outside readers in an effort to ensure objectivity and accuracy.

The Center views the books and monographs prepared on most contemporary operations as "placeholder" products or initial studies and not as the official history of the Army. Official histories take far longer to prepare. They often require historians to spend a decade or more after an operation gathering additional documents, after-action reports, lists of significant actions, operational materials, and interviews from a wide variety of sources. These official histories, in time, will also use *all* of the material collected by MHDs, unit historians, and other field historians. With the virtual demise of the Army's records management system, especially its near failure for a decade to capture operational records from deployed units, the copies of materials brought to the Center by the MHDs, unit historians, and other field historians may well be the *only* available source of key documents. Thus, both the contemporary studies prepared by the Army history community *and* the eventual production of the official history of the Army will rely heavily on those copies. Without the diligent and careful work of hundreds of soldiers and civilians collecting copies of documents and conducting oral history interviews in Afghanistan and Iraq, writing the Army's comprehensive official histories of the operations there would not be possible.

At the Center, the process for producing the final work, whether it is a contemporary history book or an official history, involves a similar journey to publication. The author sends his draft through his branch and division to the Chief Historian, who grants final approval after vetting the work with either a formal or informal panel of outside experts. He then sends the manuscript to editors who review it in great detail for style, grammar, and logic. The editor of each book collaborates closely with the author to make the manuscript more readable, to reduce the use of acronyms and slang (a common problem in writing current operational history), and to conform to the Center's style guide. Once this process is complete, the editor gives the manuscript to the production team, which works with the author to prepare custom-made maps, find photographs, and design the book in its final form. Then the text is sent to a contractor for indexing. After all this, the manuscript must be forwarded to the security review section of the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs for permission to release it to the general public. Sometimes this process involves sending the finished manuscript to various other government offices to enable them to review it for possible classified information. The Center has the tradition of protecting classified material but also has an obligation to release its studies in an unclassified form to make them available to the widest possible audience.

Finally, once all the issues have been settled and the final format has been completed and approved for public release, the camera-ready manuscript is sent to the Government Printing Office (GPO), which contracts with a commercial publisher to print the final book. The publisher delivers the books to the Army distribution warehouse in St. Louis, which sends copies to each addressee on the Army's distribution list for official publications and stores copies for subsequent requests. The Center ensures that all of its official publications are kept in stock so that they will be available to any account holder in the Army who may need them. In addition, GPO often prints extra copies so that it can sell the books to the American public. We have been told that military history books remain prominent among GPOs few money-making titles!

So, in short, all of the material collected, piece by piece, by our deployed MHDs, unit historians, and other field historical collectors is sent back to the Center, sorted, analyzed, and used for decades to come in the short-, mid-, and long-term to produce Army historical studies that capture the history of our soldiers in action. Without these collections—without these critical efforts to gather the raw material of history—the publication of that history would be greatly and perhaps fatally damaged. If historians do not have the primary sources—and the records management community shows few signs of fixing its system to gather these documents, as regulation requires them to do—they will not be able to write the detailed, thorough, and accurate contemporary studies or official histories that Army doctrine writers, students, and the American public demand of the Army Historical Program. It's that simple. The process is not pretty, and it is often slow, but its outcome is vital to the long-term health of our Army and the nation we serve.

As always, I remain open to your comments at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

(Next Chief Historian's Footnote: Why official history takes so long to produce—there are reasons!)

New CMH Publication

See page 5 for more information.